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Abstract
The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation analyzes voting behavior across multiple elections.
The voting literature has largely analyzed voter turnout and voter behavior separately,
focusing on individual elections. I present a model of voter turnout and behavior in
multiple elections. The assumptions are consistent with individual election preferences and
decision is derived from utility maximization. Additionally, I provide necessary moment
conditions for identiﬁcation. The framework is applied to the 2008 California elections.
The exit polls made national headlines by linking the historic turnout of African-Americans
for Presidential candidate Obama in helping pass Proposition 8. The results show that the
African-American turnout and voting share for Proposition 8 was lower than indicated by
the exit polls. As a counterfactual, I look at the turnout and outcome of Proposition 8,
without the presidential race on the ballot. As predicted, there is lower voter turnout: on
par with midterm elections. I also ﬁnd a lower share of Yes votes on Proposition 8 –
enough that the referendum would not have passed.
The second chapter looks at whether policies shift preferences, an important component in
policy design. We isolate exogenous variation in abortion jurisprudence using the random
assignment of Democratic appointee judges, which strongly increases the probability of a
liberal abortion decision. We also document that newspapers report appellate abortion
decisions and conduct a ﬁeld experiment assigning workers to transcribe these news reports.
Using both sources of variation, we ﬁnd that exposure to liberal abortion precedent initially
leads to more conservative public opinions, and more liberal public opinions over time.
The third chapter studies payments to physicians by pharmaceutical companies,
traditionally a topic of considerable debate. I examine which types of physicians are
iiitargeted through payments, and ﬁnd that physicians with published research are paid by
more companies and for larger amounts than non-published physicians. The eﬀect increases
in states with existing disclosure laws, consistent with reputation eﬀects. The
pharmaceutical company payments are also targeting networks of researchers versus
individual specialists. Coauthoring or citing increases the likelihood of being paid by the
same company and category. This result is consistent with higher payments under
disclosure.
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xChapter 1
What Led to the Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage in California?: Structural
Estimation of Voting Data on
Proposition 8
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is the norm in the US, and most places in the world, that multiple elections take place
at the same time. A single general election ballot typically includes national, state, and
local races, along with referendums and initiatives. The vast literature on voting outcomes
has largely taken each election individually in a vacuum, ignoring the presence and possible
eﬀect of other elections happening simultaneously. The literature on multiple elections has
focused on explaining political phenomena between diﬀerent elections such as split-ticket
voting, either as an equilibrium of strategic considerations (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996) or
due to information variation (Degan and Merlo 2011) between races.
Even if voter preferences have no strategic components and voters are perfectly in-
formed of each candidate, multiple simultaneous elections might still aﬀect each outcome
simply due to turnout. A voter considers her utility for participating in all elections, andwould go to vote only if the utility of participating is larger than the utility of staying home.1
Thus, even if voting choices between candidates in a given election are due to individual pref-
erences for each candidate, the overall turnout in the election will depend on all the races
taking place at that time.
It is well-documented that turnout varies greatly between elections (Blais 2000). The
most evident example is that US presidential elections have had historically higher voter
turnouts than midterm elections. Voters respond more strongly to presidential races than to
Congressional or local elections. (This could be due to various factors, such as the prestige
level of the oﬃce or simply more campaign advertising). For heterogeneous voters, adding
or excluding certain races like a presidential ticket will aﬀect the composition of voters who
go to the polls. This will, in turn, impact shares in other races. It may even impact election
outcome.
The prior literature has predominantly looked at turnout separately from voting be-
havior. And the ecological inference on heterogeneous voters has looked at individual election
outcomes. I present a model of turnout and voting decisions in multiple elections. When
analyzing each election outcome separately, the presence of additional races will not impact
other election results. The framework I propose considers the voter’s utility of participation
as a direct function of choices in all elections and derives turnout endogenously from utility
maximization.
Ib o r r o wf r o md i s c r e t ec h o i c ed e m a n de s t i m a t i o nt h e o r yi nas i n g l em a r k e t( B e r r ye t
al. 1995) and apply the setup to voting decisions in a single election. I then extend the model
to allow for selection in multiple elections and derive utility of turnout that is consistent with
the model’s assumptions on voting preferences. To my knowledge, this framework is the ﬁrst
to extend discrete choice literature to multiple elections, and the setup can also be used to
analyze simultaneous consumption decisions in multiple markets. I also provide identiﬁcation
condition for estimation, as the usual moment conditions rely on precinct-level variation of
1Or net-utility, if explicitly accounting for costs.
2candidate characteristics. I propose new moment conditions when the same candidate choices
are on each ballot across precincts, as is typically the case during elections. The new moment
conditions are once again consistent with the assumptions of the model.
I apply the setup to estimate turnout and outcomes in the 2008 California general
elections. The election results in California made national headlines when exit polls singled
out the historic turnout of African-American voters for the ﬁrst-ever Black presidential can-
didate, Obama, along with their strong preference for passing Proposition 8, which banned
same-sex marriage in the state. While the share of the African-American voting bloc was not
suﬃcient to make up the diﬀerence of the close election results of Proposition 8, the story
nevertheless brought to the forefront the issue of turnout for one election possibly aﬀecting
the outcome of other elections on the same ballot.
I estimate the preferences for presidential candidates Obama and McCain and voting
Yes or No on Proposition 8 (Prop 8) for each demographic. When compared to exit poll
results, African-Americans had a lower turnout and lower share of Yes votes on Prop 8.
(Although they came out in large numbers and the majority voted Yes on Prop 8). As a
counterfactual, I look at the turnout and election outcome of Prop 8 without the presidential
race on the ballot. The structural setup of the model allows for such analysis, and the
counterfactual results are consistent with the observed preferences of voting in both elections.
I ﬁnd lower turnout without the presidential election as predicted by the model and on a par
with midterm election results. I also ﬁnd that Proposition 8 would have most likely been
defeated.
The intuition of the model predicts that part of the voting population who chose to
vote for president and Prop 8, may abstain from voting when the choice is for Proposition
8o n l y . 2 The intuition for the outcome of Proposition 8 is similar. The estimates indicate
2It is clear that voting in two elections will give at least as much utility as voting in one election, since the
voter may simply abstain from the second election. Given that a very small percentage actually abstain from
the election, the voter gains positive utility from at least one of the choices in each election. This implies
that almost all voters will gain a strictly higher utility from voting in two elections versus one.
3the demographic groups with a strong preference for one of the presidential candidates:
Hispanics and Blacks overwhelmingly voted in favor of Obama. Incidentally, they are also
the demographic groups with the highest share of Yes votes on Proposition 8. Eliminating the
presidential election from the ballot reduces turnout, but not uniformly across demographics.
Voters with the strongest preference for one of the presidential candidate are less likely to
vote in this case. In other words, the drop in turnout for Blacks and Hispanics will be higher
than for other demographics. Thus, the share of remaining Yes votes will decrease more than
the share of No votes. The drop is enough to overturn the election outcome of Prop 8.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review
of relevant literature on discrete choice models, voting, and the 2008 election. Section 3
presents the data sources and compares them to polling data. Section 4 presents the model,
and derives identiﬁcation. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w
2.1 Related Literature
The extensive literature on voting also includes the choices of voters over multiple elections
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, and Alesina and Rosenthal 1996). Prior research largely looks
at strategic choices across multiple elections. Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), for instance,
have shown that interesting dynamics can arise when the ballot choice set goes from one to
two elections. Such political normalities as a divided government and a midterm reversion
can, in fact, be borne out as stable equilibrium outcomes. I abstract away from strategic
considerations and treat a voting choice as a pure consumption choice. This is done in part
because voters’ choices have an inﬁnitesimal impact on election outcomes, and partly because
it is harder to devise a strategic storyline for election choices consisting of a nationwide
presidential campaign and a state referendum. A lack of strategic choices still does not
preclude considering the elections simultaneously. Voter action in one election may still
4aﬀect the results in another due to the participation constraint of going to the voting booth.
I treat the voting choice as a consumption choice, which naturally leads to analyzing demand
literature.
Recent advances in demand estimation have found applications in many markets, or
even ﬁelds of economics. Pioneered by the seminal work of Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth,
BLP), a structural model of discrete choice random coeﬃcients setup is used to study in-
dustries as varied as automobiles (BLP), cereals (Nevo 2001), movies (Einav 2007), and TV
broadcast (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004). The models are based on individual optimizing de-
cisions, aggregated to obtain market shares. The model’s main advantage is the ability to
match aggregate market-level (macro-level) data that has total product sales and character-
istics with consumer demographics. One does not need to have individual-level (micro-level)
data that matches consumer characteristics with their purchases. The models are general
enough to produce reasonable markups and substitution patterns.
This paper extends the BLP framework and develops a model that analyzes consumer
participation and consumption in multiple markets. Many purchases take place simultane-
ously in multiple markets, e.g., an individual buying milk and bread in the same shopping
trip, making this is a relevant setup for demand analysis. Estimating bread and milk mar-
kets separately might produce incorrect results, especially in terms of participation. The
consumer considers her choices in both markets and weights the total utility of bread and
milk purchases in the decision to go to the store.
I develop a framework that allows for a joint decision to participate in several markets.
The decision will be a function of the utilities of all the products, and I show the assumptions
to be consistent with the BLP setup. My methodology is unique for two reasons. First,
I derive demand estimates using only aggregate, macro-level, data. Prior literature that
looks at purchases in multiple markets uses individual-level data, tying consumers to their
bundle of products.3 To my knowledge, my research is the ﬁrst to rely on only aggregate
3See, e.g., the class of AIDS models.
5data. Complicating the matter of using only aggregate data is that shares are usually
reported for individual products, but not for bundles of products, which are the relevant
choices for the consumer. In other words, suppose there are two possible choices for bread –
bread1,bread2,a n dt w op o s s i b l ec h o i c e sf o rm i l k–milk1,milk2.I ft h ec o n s u m e rp u r c h a s e s
one of each, her choice set will be from (bread1,milk1),(bread1,milk2),(bread2,milk1),
and (bread2,milk2). The aggregate shares are usually reported not for the combination of
each of these four bundles, but for bread1,bread2,milk1,a n dmilk2 separately. I am able
to derive the shares of each possible bundle from the product market shares.
Second, I obtain identiﬁcation despite no product-level variation. The main identiﬁ-
cation from logit-type models like BLP comes from product space and product characteristic
variations across markets, most notably, price. I show that consumer variation across mar-
kets, such as demographic diﬀerences, could be used instead to carry out estimation. My
methodology once again conforms to the assumptions of the BLP setup.
The BLP approach has been used widely to analyze diﬀerent markets and forms of
competition, using the key methodology – heterogeneous preferences and endogenous prices.
These include Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002), and Berry et al. (2004). Applications to other
forms of competition extend to advertising (Ackerberg 2001, Anand and Shachar 2011), the
expansion of satellite broadcast (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004), geographic distribution (Davis
2006), and the real estate market (Wong 2013), among others.
In the voting literature, ecological inference on election outcomes has a long tradition
(King 1997). Analyzing voting data in a discrete choice framework dates back to as early
as Poole and Rosenthal (1985). Applying the BLP framework to voter preferences has been
used by Rekkas (2007), Gordon and Hartmann (2013), and Martin (2013). In all these cases,
campaign spending is used as a substitute for price in the individual utility speciﬁcation,
which provides key moment conditions and identiﬁcation of the model. In my setup I am
able to derive identiﬁcation despite no campaign spending or any other product characteristic
that varies at the market-level.
6Hendel (1999) presents a model of multiple markets. However, his model allows
for multiple purchases in a given market, e.g., a ﬁrm buying multiple PCs or even various
brands of PCs. In my setup, the choice is clearly for up to one candidate in each election,
and diﬀerent election races are related primarily by appearing on the same ballot. Perhaps
the paper closest in spirit to this one is by Degan and Merlo (2011). The authors develop a
structural model of participating in multiple elections, and apply the setup to presidential
and Congressional House races on the same ballot. My approach is diﬀerent from theirs in
several key aspects. First, they use individual, micro-level data, whereas my setup can be
used with macro-level data. Second, they model the decision to take part in an election
as a function of civic duty, which is the same for both elections. Whether to participate
in voting, and the diﬀerence in voters’ preferences for candidates, is due to information
(and misinformation) the voter has for each race. By eliminating one of the elections, the
outcome in the other election would not change. In my case, the utility from each race
depends on observable voter characteristics, such as demographics. The decision to vote is
directly determined by all the elections taking place. The utility from turnout is derived as
the total utility from choosing a candidate in each election.
2.2 Proposition 8 Background
State amendments and propositions to allow or ban gay marriage were among the news-
worthy issues in the 2008 general election. The issue had come to the forefront since the
Massachusetts State High Court decision in 2003, and many states subsequently moved
to add constitutional amendments through public referendums. In 2008, three additional
states – Arizona, California, and Florida – had ballot measures prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage. Probably none received as much media attention as did Proposition 8 in California.
As stated on the ballot, voting Yes to Prop 8 would add a provision to the state constitution
that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”.4 Ear-
4http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8
7lier in 2008, the California State Supreme Court granted permission for same-sex marriages,
and by election time, many same-sex marriages had already taken place. Passing Prop 8
would invalidate the State Supreme Court ruling, and the status of already-issued same-sex
marriage certiﬁcates would be in jeopardy.
Proposition 8 passed with 7,001,084 (52.24%) Yes to 6,401,482 (47.76%) No votes.
The passage sparked many protests and demonstrations. Its aﬀect on existing same-sex
marriages, and even the validity of the entire proposition, was challenged in court. Through
successive appeals to higher courts, the case reached the United States Supreme Court. In
June 2013, the US Supreme Court declined to take up the case, eﬀectively handing down
the lower court ruling overturning Proposition 8. (The court also ruled that all same-sex
marriages be federally recognized.) On a nationwide scale, there is also political discussion
to pass legislature for broader gay rights (for instance, President Obama’s second inaugural
speech).5
Perhaps more interesting, in the aftermath of the election, was the analysis of the
passage itself. Less than 5% of the total vote separated the Yes and No choices. Any one
determining factor could have been the deciding factor between the passage of the proposition
and its defeat. The only available data immediately after the election were exit polls. Most
produced similar results, and as the CNN polls6 or The New York Times polls7 indicate, for
instance, the demographic breakdown of California voters showed that Whites, Hispanics,
Asians, and Other races were almost evenly split in favor of, or against, Proposition 8. Across
a gender divide, males and females were also almost evenly split in their sentiment for Prop
8. The only glaring exceptions were African-Americans/Blacks, who were an overwhelming
70% in favor of Prop 8. The runaway story from the exit polls was that the Black population
turned out in great numbers to vote for the ﬁrst-ever Black presidential candidate, Barack
Obama, and in the process, helped tip the scales in favor of the passage of Prop 8. This
5http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oﬃce/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama
6http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#CAI01p1
7http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/exitpolls/california.html
8storyline was reported by all the major newspapers, such as The New York Times,8 the Los
Angeles Times,9 The Washington Post,10 and other media outlets.11
I apply my framework to analyze voting in the 2008 elections in California by looking
at the presidential race and the Proposition 8 ballot measure. I look at the relative weight
of each demographic on the passage of Proposition 8 by using the oﬃcial election results for
the 2008 general election. This method has several advantages over poll results.12 Primarily,
the polling results have weights applied to match the population average. Such weights may
produce distorted results when looking at only a particular demographic. Second, the oﬃcial
election data uses the entire population of the voting count, rather than the poll sample,
which may not be representative or could suﬀer from other types of sample bias. Also, the
election results are actual choices made, whereas poll responses are self-reported. Third,
the overall oﬃcial turnout, broken down by precincts, provides a more direct comparison
to that of previous years. Finally, the election results also include absentee and overseas
ballots, which are not fully represented in exit polls but are, nevertheless, becoming relevant
portions of overall electorate counts. According to the oﬃcial vote count by the Secretary
of State of California, 41.64% of all votes were cast by mail.13
The main drawback of using election results data is that they are precinct-level
(macro-level), whereas poll data is individual-level (micro-level). That is, at the poll level,
one knows the demographics of an individual, matched with her voting choices. To compute
voting preferences across all races then becomes a matter of straightforward computation.
In election results, however, one only knows the overall votes for each election, and the
breakdown of possible combinations of election choices is not given. To overcome the lack
8http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06marriage.html
9http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/08/local/me-gayblack8
10http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/06/AR2008110603880.html
11E.g., http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2008/11/original_skin.html
12Greiner and Quinn (2013) provides a statistical model to combine election results with poll results.
13http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf
9of detailed data, I introduce a structural model of voter turnout and voting in multiple elec-
tions. Thus, with my model I can potentially explain the behavior of going to vote on a
presidential election, and in the process, also voting on Prop 8. At the heart of my structural
model is discrete choice estimation.
3D a t a
3.1 Census Data
The two main sources of my data are the US Census,14 and the voting data from the Cal-
ifornia Statewide Database.15 The US Census, conducted decennially, provides a detailed
description of the population and businesses at a local geographic level. The smallest level
of aggregation depends on the choice of variables and is selected such that individual entries
cannot be identiﬁed from the aggregate data. Race and gender characteristics for the US
population are broken down to block level, the ﬁnest geographic level possible. Other vari-
ables, like income, are provided over a larger geographic area. I am primarily interested in
racial characteristics of the population and their impact on elections, and so I collect census
data at the block level. Moreover, I restrict the population age to 18 and over, which is the
relevant fraction of Americans who can vote.16 There is no census for the year 2008, so I use
the census ﬁgures from 2000 and 2010 to extrapolate the population demographics for 2008.
The California Statewide Database is an online redistricting database commissioned
by the state itself. It has detailed voting and registration data for all elections since 1992,
broken down at the county, district, and precinct levels. Moreover, it provides mapping
between census geography units – blocks, and election geography units – precincts. I use the
14http://www.census.gov
15http://swdb.berkeley.edu
16The portion of the population who is ineligible to vote may still be an issue. They may not be US
citizens, or haven’t registered in time for the elections. I explore alternative baseline populations.
10mapping to match race characteristics to voting outcomes across precincts.17
Regarding race categories, the 2000 Census diﬀered from the previous ones in that
it introduced two or more options as possible choices for the category of race.18 In addi-
tion to mixed race, ethnicity was now primarily divided between Hispanic/Latino and non-
Hispanic/Latino. The 2010 Census followed in the same manner, making the distinction
between ethnicity and race more explicit. In the 2010 Census, the possible choices for single
race are: White, Black or African American, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian,
Native Hawaiian and Other Paciﬁc Islander, and ﬁnally, Other. Additionally, it includes all
possible combinations of mixed races, starting with any two diﬀerent races to a maximum
of six. The population numbers are reported in two ways. One set of tables is organized
along race categories. The other is ﬁrst broken down by two ethnicities – Hispanic/Latino,
and non-Hispanic/Latino – and the non-Hispanic/Latino population is further tabulated by
race. Without the ethnicity option and the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second methods
of reporting, the Hispanic/Latino population identiﬁes themselves primarily as either White,
or Other race.19
Im a k eu s eo ft h es e c o n dw a yo fr e p o r t i n gc e n s u sn u m b e r st oh a v eas e p a r a t ec a t e g o r y
for Hispanics, which is one of the important demographic characteristics in my estimation.
The population numbers vary greatly among the six races, as shown in Table 1.1. I combine
the individual races into ﬁve major, mutually exclusive categories – Hispanic (henceforth,
Hispanic); White (henceforth, White); Black or African American (henceforth, Black); Asian
or Native Hawaiian and Other Paciﬁc Islander (henceforth, Asian); American Indian and
Alaska Native or Other (henceforth, Other).20 This method is dictated by the OMB Directive
17The mapping ﬁle does not match with perfect accuracy either with the census blocks or with election
precincts. This mismatch is the main source of discrepancy when trying to merge the two datasets; whenever
such a discrepancy was too large, I looked for alternate places for datasets, where I could obtain information
on missing precincts and blocks.
18http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d02p.pdf
19Only about 2% identify as some other race or a mixed race.
20Alternatively, I combine the Native Hawaiian and Other Paciﬁc Islander, American Indian and Alaska
Native, and Other race into one, Other race. Another possible alternative is to put American Indian and
111521 and seems to be the most widely used method of categorization in practice and in the
literature (Greiner and Quinn 2013).
Ia l s of o l l o wt h es a m ed i r e c t i v ea n dc o m b i n et w oo rm o r er a c e si n t oas i n g l er a c ei nt h e
following fashion.22 All the people identiﬁed as Hispanic ethnicity, are classiﬁed as Hispanic.
Within the non-Hispanic population, if one of the races with which a person identiﬁes is
Black, then that person is classiﬁed as Black. Otherwise, if one of the races a person identiﬁes
with is Asian, then that person is classiﬁed in the Asian category. Otherwise, if it is a mix
of White and Other, I classify them as White. Finally, if a person is a mix of Other races,
I put that person in the Other category. This is one possible way of combining multiple
races into one, and there are certainly other ways of aggregating mixed races. Since the vast
majority of the Census, or about 98%, are either Hispanic or single race, the variations in
the breakdown of multiple races into single ones would not have a material impact on the
results. In summary, this enables me to place the Census population into one of possible ﬁve
possible categories: White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Other.
3.2 Voting Data
Table 1.1 shows data from the California Statewide database website. The 2008 general elec-
tion had 8,274,473 votes for the Democratic Presidential candidate (Obama), and 5,011,781
votes for the Republican Presidential candidate (McCain); 7,001,084 Yes votes for Propo-
sition 8, with 6,401,482 No votes. Given the close result for Prop 8, it is not surprising
that possible explanations and theories have been topics of intense analysis and scrutiny.
These numbers are an exact match with the oﬃcial count of the California election results
as reported by the Secretary of State of California.23 It is interesting to note that these
Alaska Native into the Hispanic ethnicity, and keep Other race as a stand alone category.
21http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_directive_15
22Remember that two or more races can come from the combination of the following races: White, Black,
Asian, and Other.
23http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf
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13numbers do not coincide precisely with the initial press release ﬁgures printed in The New
York Times 24 or USA Today,f o re x a m p l e . 2526 The press release numbers underreport the
outcomes for both candidates and both choices on Proposition 8. The initially reported
results were even closer for Prop 8, making discussions about demographics particularly sig-
niﬁcant. This is primarily due to the fact that numbers reﬂecting the initial counts are not
updated to include all possible remaining ballots (absentee, questionable, and otherwise)
that are added to the ﬁnal tally. The eventual voting count is ﬁnalized and certiﬁed many
weeks after the election, and it is usually a formality as the results are known by this time.
(Unless, of course, the close results trigger a recount). Nevertheless, I work with complete
election results, which includes all accepted votes.
3.3 Merging
The block-by-block addition of the 2000 Census ﬁgures, reported in Table 1.1, matches the
oﬃcial Census count27 of 24,621,819 people in California who are 18 years of age and over.
The 2010 Census28 summation also matches the oﬃcial ﬁgure of 27,958,916 Californians who
are 18 years old and over.
I ﬁrst merge 2000 and 2010 Census datasets to estimate the population size and de-
mographic breakdown for 2008. I do so by assuming a linear trend of population growth
for each block-level demographic group. For each 2000 Census block, I match it with the
corresponding 2010 block (or blocks, if there has been any redrawing between censuses), and
compute the average of each demographic category for the 2008 population.29 In this way,
24http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/california.html
25http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/ca.htm
26http://content.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/
StateDetailResultsByState.aspx?oi=I&rti=G&cn=1&sp=CA
27http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/ca.html,
http://www.census.gov/census2000/xls/ca_tab_1.xls
28http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?ﬂ=06
29If the mapping from a 2000 Census block does not lead to a unique 2010 Census block, I match it to
14I can ensure that each block-demographic combination has its own growth rate rather than
averaging several growth rates together – for instance, faster growing blocks or demographics
with slower growing blocks. In addition, I do not have to worry about computing an unrea-
sonably large population for very fast growing block-demographics since I calculate weighted
means of two endpoints as opposed to forecasting into the future.
With my approach, I get a total population of 27,446,193 of California residents for
2008 who are 18 years old and over. The demographic breakdown of the total population is
given as: 12,538,434 are White, 1,746,243 are Black, 8,824,512 are Hispanic, 3,886,755 are
Asian, and the remaining 450,249 are Other race. Since there is no oﬃcial census count for
2008 as a comparison, I can instead look at the American Community Survey ﬁgures,30 also
conducted by the census. There, the population estimate for 2008 is 27,420,473, which is
very close to the ﬁgure I obtain. Given that their estimate error is +/ 0.1%,i ti sh e a r t e n i n g
to see that my estimate falls within their margin of error. I do not use American Community
Survey results for the 2008 population as those ﬁgures are not broken down to block-level
observations, even though they have a very detailed racial breakdown of the population.31
I then merge the 2008 population ﬁgures with 2008 voting data. As with any merger,
I do not get a perfectly accurate matching. I also eliminate small precincts – those with
total votes or a total population of less than 100. This ensures that the precinct has a large
enough sample size to be treated as a market for discrete choice estimation.32 Ia l s oe l i m i n a t e
precincts where the total vote is larger than the overall population. Finally, I remove the
all the 2010 census blocks that have an area in common with the 2000 block. More speciﬁcally, take a 2000
block, with area A. Then take all the 2010 blocks that contain some part of A. If the sum of the areas of
all those 2010 blocks is B, and their total population is P, then the relevant 2010 population for the 2000
block will be P*A/B. Thus I assume equal demographic density between neighboring blocks, which provides
proportional weight, relative to their areas. With this approach, I ensure correct mapping under various
scenarios from 2000 blocks to 2010 blocks, such as 1-to-1, many-to-1, or 1-to-many. The approach then
extends naturally to the many-to-many block mappings.
30http://www2.census.gov/acs2008_1yr/prod/SelectPopulationProﬁle/State/California.csv
31Including nationalities and ethnicities.
32In theory, the market shares are the total population shares, and if a sample size is used, one needs to
account for sample size variance as well.
15precincts with less than a 5% or over a 95% participation rate. These constitute only a
handful of precincts, and such outlier rates come from precinct grouping and not necessarily
from population voting choices. It also ensures that the outside alternative of not going to
vote is well-deﬁned in my estimation.33 After merging the three datasets – 2000 Census, 2010
Census and 2008 voting data, I ﬁnish with 26,532,519 people for whom I have block-level
demographic and precinct-level voting information. I also account for 18,807 of the 25,423
precincts that have a total of 12,445,659 votes, from which 7,536,220 voted for a Democratic
president, 4,499,673 for a Republican; 6,361,321 voted Yes on Prop 8, while 5,797,454 voted
No. Table 1.2 shows that there is roughly an equal proportional decrease in the number of
votes and races as in my matched sample and I get the same aggregate racial composition
and voting shares as in the census numbers and the overall voting tally.34 It is worthwhile
to note that I account for the vast majority of the population and the votes, and since I
capture the aggregate demographic and voting variation, my results can be extended to the
entire population. Plus, given that I have the detailed breakdown of all block-level data, I
can map the results for all Californians and estimate voting outcomes not just on the merged
data, but for the entire population.
The summary statistics for the 2008 elections in Table 1.1 show the variation of
demographics and voting outcomes. Figure 1.1 plots the relationship between the share of
each demographic group in the precinct and the percentage of the vote that the Democratic
candidate, Obama, received. Figure 1.2 draws the same picture of voter demographics on the
share of Yes votes on Prop 8. A few patterns immediately emerge from the ﬁgures. For the
White population in both votes, the dispersion grows as the share of the White population
increases. The 100% (or nearly 100%) all-White precincts have the most variance on voting
choices. This indicates no clear preference for either candidate nor choice for Prop 8 by White
33I do not eliminate the tails for the voting choices, as I believe it will omit valuable information about
demographic choices.
34I am currently investigating the cause of imperfect mapping from blocks to precincts, and will possibly
raise the matching percentage between the datasets. However, a higher matching rate will not aﬀect the
results.
16Racial Breakdown White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Overall Population 45.7% 6.4% 14.2% 32.2% 1.6%
Sample 45.2% 6.4% 14.3% 32.5% 1.6%
Voting Breakdown Participation Obama McCain Prop 8 Yes Prop 8 No
Overall Population 50.1% 61.0% 37.0% 52.2% 47.8%
Pres. Partic. Obama McCain Prop 8 Partic. Yes No Overall 
Population 48.4% 62.3% 37.7% 48.8% 52.2% 47.8%
Sample 48.1% 62.6% 37.4% 48.5% 52.3% 47.7%
Table 1.2. Population and Sample Shares
Voting Breakdown between 
Obama/McCain, Yes/No
voters. Such a dispersion can be accounted for by the unobserved consumer characteristic.
The model setup will still enable me to have diﬀerent preferences for minority demographics,
which can diﬀer from each other as evident from the ﬁgures.
The graphs for the minority demographics show a completely diﬀerent picture. Fig-
ures 1.1 and 1.2 depict a generally favorable preference both for Obama in the presidential
election and for a Yes vote on Prop 8. Some other interesting points merit discussion. In
the Prop 8 ﬁgure, the shares of Yes in largely Black precincts have roughly the same mean
as the shares in largely Asian and Hispanic precincts. In the presidential election, there is
ac l e a rf a v o r a b l eb i a st o w a r dO b a m ab yB l a c k ,A s i a n ,a n dH i s p a n i cd e m o g r a p h i c s . 35 The
Hispanic and Black populations both approach close to 100% as their precinct shares in-
crease, with the Black population having a smaller variance for moderate to high shares.
It is encouraging to have this conﬁrmed in the raw data, as conventional wisdom dictates
that Blacks were strongly in favor of Obama.36 Later in the estimation, however, this causes
problems for the discrete choice estimation with no unobserved voter characteristic, as the
35To get the overall impact of demographics over preferences, the entire distribution is needed.
36Though probably not close to 100%.
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19coeﬃcient for Blacks is undeﬁned (or rather approaches positive inﬁnity).37 For the Other
demographic, there is not enough variation at high levels to obtain reasonable preference es-
timates. In the estimations, I also ﬁnd very low participation by Other voters. Therefore, I
combine the Other demographic with the White demographics, and treat this as the baseline
demographic.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 provide a mechanical intuition of why exit poll results might have
provided incorrect results for the subpopulations of diﬀerent demographics. At the heart of
the issue is the question of whether there is reason to believe that the exit polls could provide
incorrect predictions for demographic preferences over ballot choices. When the exit poll raw
numbers are aggregated, they are weighted to give, on average, correct predictions for the
entire population over the elections.38 As such, by restricting the sample to a subpopulation
–s u c ha sc e r t a i nd e m o g r a p h i c s–t h eo u t c o m e sm i g h tb es t r o n g l yw e i g h t e di no n ed i r e c t i o n
or another, and the results for that subset could be swayed in either direction while being
correct for the entire population.39
The ﬁgures show the plot of the imputed exit poll versus actual voting numbers for
each precinct. Figure 1.3 does this for the Going to Vote share, and Figure 1.4 for the share
of voting Yes on Proposition 8. For each precinct, I calculate the expected number of total
voters and Prop 8 Yes votes based on the exit poll ratios. I then subtract the actual number
of votes and Prop 8 Yes votes. The data points are then plotted by ﬁrst being grouped into
20 equal-sized bins, based on the share of the demographic percentage in a precinct. I also ﬁt
al i n e a rm o d e l .L o o k i n ga tt h eG o i n gt oV o t es h a r e ,i ti se v i d e n tt h a te x i tp o l l so v e r s t a t et h e
number of Blacks and Hispanics who went to the polls and understate the number of Whites
and Asians than actual numbers indicate. The exit polls suggest a higher participation in
precincts with large Black or Hispanic populations than the actual turnout. Similarly, they
37I have also analyzed the results of the 2004 election and the optimization does not suﬀer from this
problem.
38http://www.ncpp.org/drupal57/ﬁles/Weighting.pdf
39That is partly why the margin of error for the subpopulation is usually larger than for the entire sample,
and it is possible for the estimates not to conform to the actual results, even after accounting for the error.
20show lower turnout in overwhelmingly White or Asian precincts compared to actual election
results. As for Prop 8 votes, there is again overstatement of the Black percentage of votes
than is borne out in the election results. As the raw data indicates, the exit poll ﬁgures
seem to overstate both the Black participation and preference for voting Yes on Prop 8; this
is what I ﬁnd in my own estimation, as well. They also seem to suggest understatement of
Hispanic voting preferences on Yes for Prop 8, which is also borne out in the results.
4M o d e l
4.1 The Benchmark Model
The main obstacle to using discrete choice setup for the voting data is that there is one
market in the discrete choice model. On the other hand, if the voter decides to participate,
she chooses one candidate or ballot choice in all the elections taking place at the time. Further
complicating matters is the fact that voting results are reported by each race (or "market")
instead of combinations of races. For instance, suppose there are only two elections on
the ballot – for president and governor, and only two candidates in each race – Democrat
and Republican. The reported election results tell only how many people have voted for
aD e m o c r a ti nt h ep r e s i d e n t i a le l e c t i o n ,a n dh o wm a n yh a v ev o t e df o raD e m o c r a ti nt h e
gubernatorial election, but not how many have voted all Democrat – (Democrat, Democrat)
–i nb o t hr a c e s . 40
One approach might be to treat each election race count, along with the outside option
numbers, as its own individual market. This, however, does not conform to the individual
utility maximization, as presumably the voter makes the choice to go to an election by
considering her utility for all the races taking place, and not just from a speciﬁc election.
Moreover, there is no clear, intuitive way to combine the results to obtain voting counts for
say, the (Democrat, Democrat) option that is derived from preferences.
40Such cross-tabulation of results is usually found in polls and surveys only.
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23 
CONSUMER
Market 2
Market 1
Market 3
OUTSIDE OPTION
1a 1b 1c
2b 2c 2a
Not Going
Going
3a 3b 3c
Figure 1.5: The Decision Tree
I present a nested logit speciﬁcation of voter demand. The framework allows me to
model the decision of simultaneously choosing products from multiple markets. Moreover,
my analysis remains consistent with individual utility maximization, and does not require
additional assumptions or conditions beyond what is imposed by the discrete choice litera-
ture.
For the setup of the model, suppose there are m1,m 2,...,m L markets, each oﬀering
J1,J 2,...,J L number of products. Without loss of generalization, I assume that the outside
option is common to all markets. That is, if the consumer chooses to participate in one of the
markets, then she will participate in all markets. Alternatively, I can introduce an outside
option to the product space for each individual market and eliminate the aggregate outside
option, as then the aggregate outside option will be the joint union of all individual outside
options. Figure 1.5 presents the graphical tree representation of the consumer decision.
The consumer i chooses the products cj1,c j2,...,c jL in each of the markets m1,m 2,...,m L,
respectively. The number of possible combinations for the bundle of products is J1 ⇥ J2 ⇥
... ⇥ JL +1and in the ideal setup, I would have the actual market shares for each combina-
24tion matched with the model’s predicted market shares.41 However, in the voting data
(or in a general macro-level demand data), I only have the shares of the outside good
and the goods in each of the markets mt individually, and not the combination. This
gives me a total of J1 + J2 + ... + JL +1observable market shares. Since in general,
J1 +J2 +...+JL +1<< J1 ⇥J2 ⇥...⇥JL +1, I will not have enough identiﬁcation to back
out J1 ⇥ J2 ⇥ ... ⇥ JL +1market shares without additional assumptions. I show that the
discrete choice framework is suﬃcient to obtain all the shares of the possible combinations.
My discrete choice logit consists of two loops. On the outer loop, the voter decides
whether to go to vote, or not. Conditional on going to the election, I then have the inner
loop, where the voter i makes the choice for her preferred candidate for each election. For a
given election or market mt,t h ei n n e rl o o pr e d u c e st oas t a n d a r dd i s c r e t ec h o i c e .I np a r t i c -
ular, let the possible products have mean utilities  1,..., Jt,t h ei n d i v i d u a lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c so f
the consumer are ⌫i1,...,⌫ip and the product characteristics of j are xj1,...,x jq.L e tk enu-
merate the relevant consumer and producer characteristic interactions in market mt from
the maximum possible pq pairs. Then, the utility for choosing product j will be:
uijt =  jt +
X
k
↵k⌫ikxkj + "ijt
where "ijt is i.i.d. Type-I extreme value error term. Note that the mean utility term
 jt includes all product characteristics, including the unobserved product characteristic.
In each market mt then the consumer chooses the product with the highest utility.
Since "ijt is i.i.d. Type-I, the optimization can be integrated out with a closed form solution
for the probability. The probability of choosing good s is:
Pr(jt = s)=
exp( s +
P
↵k⌫ikxks)
Jt P
r=1
exp( r +
P
↵k⌫ikxkr)
(1.1)
41Even with that ideal setup, there can also be an issue of how to specify the utility as a function of the
bundle, if the product characteristics enter non-linearly into the mean utility.
25These probabilities are then computed for all the products in all the markets. For the
integration to get market shares, the standard assumption in the discrete choice literature is
used, that "ijt are independent across products and consumers. I can go one step further and
assume that "ijt are also independent across markets. This assumption is rather innocuous as
the error terms for products within a market are more likely to be correlated than the error
terms for products across markets.42 Then, since each market product choice is independent
from other markets, the probability of selecting a particular bundle jt1 = s1,...,jt L = sL
will be a product of individual probabilities:
Pr(jt1 = s1,...,jt L = sL)=
exp( s1 +
P
↵k⌫ikxks1)
P
r1
exp( r1 +
P
↵k⌫ikxkr1)
·...·
exp( sL +
P
↵z⌫izxzsL)
P
rL
exp( rL +
P
↵z⌫izxzrL)
(1.2)
The diﬀerence in the notation between k and z allows the possibility that in diﬀerent
markets diﬀerent consumer-producer characteristic pairs might be relevant. They would
also enter the individual utility speciﬁcation with diﬀerent magnitudes, speciﬁed by ↵. This
probability is computed for each individual and each market combination. The aggregate
market share is computed by integrating over all the individuals in the market, which is
equivalent to integrating over the distributions of all consumer characteristics. This gives
the market shares for each of the J1 ⇥ J2 ⇥ ... ⇥ JL product combinations that represent all
possible shares conditional on participating in the market.
4.1.1 The Participation Constraint
The ﬁnal stage is to bring back the decision to participate or abstain from Figure 1.5, and
compute the model predicted probabilities of both decisions. To do this, note that the
42If needed, there is an option to add correlation for the error terms across the products, similar to Berry
(1994), and Cardell (1997). Another way to interpret the standard discrete choice assumption is that only
the product characteristics, along with the interaction of product and consumer characteristics determine
the correlation between product choices.
26probability shares for the combination of the goods can be rewritten as:
Pr(jt1 = s1,...,jt L = sL)=
exp( s1 + ... +  sL +
P
↵k⌫ikxks1 + ... +
P
↵z⌫izxzsL)
P
r1...rL
exp( r1 + ... +  rL +
P
↵k⌫ikxkr1 + ... +
P
↵z⌫izxzrL)
(1.3)
This expression can be treated as if being a solution to a discrete choice random
coeﬃcients model, with mean utilities of  s1 + ... +  sL,f o rt h ep r o d u c tc o m b i n a t i o no f
{s1,...,s L},a n dt h eb u n d l e ’ sp r o d u c tc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sb e i n gt h eu n i o no fi n d i v i d u a lp r o d u c t
characteristics:
S
{xks1,...,x ksL}. The consumer characteristics set is also the union of all
consumer characteristics, if not all consumer attributes enter in all product utilities. Looking
at the probabilities this way, the solution in equation (1.3) can be represented as the solution
in equation (1.1) to a standard discrete choice optimization problem. The joint selection of
individual products in diﬀerent markets is therefore equivalent to a single discrete choice
decision for the entire bundle, with the mean utility of  s1 + ... +  sL,a n dp r o d u c ta t t r i b u t e
set of
S
{xks1,...,x ksL}.
To ﬁnalize the model, I also need to add the leftmost branch of the decision tree:
whether or not to participate in the market. Having established the selection of product
bundles as a familiar discrete choice optimization, adding another “product” in the choice
set can still be shown as an expression like in equation (1.1). In the discrete choice setup,
the maximum of all error terms, net of mean utilities and interaction terms (i.e. the error
term that gives highest utility), will also have Type-I extreme value distribution (Cardell
1997). If {s1,...,s L} is the maximizing combination, then the decision between choosing
that, or not participating at all entails a choice between two terms with the same Type-I
distributive error terms. Once again, the solution to this discrete choice setup will have
the familiar expression for the probabilities of the shares. A general combination of product
probabilities, including the outside option to the choice set amounts to adding the expression
exp( 0) to the denominator of equation (1.3). Alternatively, I scale all the inner choices of
participating by  g, called the utility of “going”, which will again normalize the outside
27option’s mean utility to 0,a si sc u s t o m a r yi nt h el i t e r a t u r e .
The entire decision tree of the consumer can be computed as a two-stage estimation.
First, one would estimate the decision to go or to abstain. This will provide the mean utility
of going,  g. Then, conditional on going, one would estimate the individual market shares:
{ s1,..., sL}. The mean utility of the bundle, {s1,...,s L}, will then be:  s1 + ... +  sL +  g,
with the product attribute set being the union of all the markets’ product attributes. Such a
setup provides correct within and participation shares. Moreover, one can do counterfactual
analysis if the underlying conditions in the decision tree, or in any of the markets, change.
4.2 Moment Conditions
The typical identiﬁcation for the logit speciﬁcation is again problematic in my case. At
the macro level with only market shares available, variation in product choices and product
characteristics (price, in particular) across markets is used to set up the appropriate moment
conditions. This is not applicable in my case. In the California elections I analyze, the same
choices are on the ballot in each precinct. In the voting literature the candidate/product
characteristic is typically constant across markets, unless it includes region-speciﬁc campaign
spending (Rekkas 2007, Gordon and Hartmann 2013, and Martin 2013). Even with detailed
candidate characteristics, in my voting scenario the product dummies will encompass all
other individual characteristics. Therefore, I do not even "open up" the mean utility term
 jt,a n di n s t e a de s t i m a t ei ti ni t se n t i r e t y . 43
Iu s et h ev a r i a t i o ni na g g r e g a t ec o n s u m e rc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa c r o s sm a r k e t st og e ti d e n -
tiﬁcation. Taken at face value, the mean utility term in the logit speciﬁcation is composed
of only product characteristics and should be orthogonal to individual consumer character-
istics. By aggregating the consumer characteristic over the market, I obtain the market
demographic distribution for that characteristic. The orthogonality of the distribution term
with the mean utility term still holds from the independence of individual characteristics.
43micro-BLP (2004) also takes a similar approach.
28This provides the basis for my estimation. That is, if  jt Ej ( jt) is the mean utility of prod-
uct j in precinct t,n o r m a l i z e dt oh a v em e a n0 across all precincts, and wt is the distribution
parameter of consumer characteristics, (e.g., the share of whites in precinct t), then:
E (( jt   Ej ( jt))wt)=0 (1.4)
The orthogonality applies to all products and all consumer demographic components.
Since the model assumptions call for complete independence, one may also use higher order
terms for distribution components.
The above procedure appears as if the mean utility is treated like an error term.
Viewed this way, my moment condition takes the shape of a standard econometric assump-
tion of identiﬁcation around the error distribution. In fact, such an approach is not far
fetched. In traditional logit speciﬁcation, the mean utility term is split into two components:
observed and unobserved product characteristics. The unobserved product characteristic
then serves as the error term, around which the moment conditions are built. I treat the
entire mean utility, net of mean, as an unobserved product characteristic and form the mo-
ment conditions accordingly. One can still add additional information in the  jt term, such
as ﬁxed eﬀects. I do that by including county dummies, which restricts the variation to
within-county deviations.
5E s t i m a t i o n
5.1 Going to Vote
I compare my benchmark model with a parsimonious model that incorporates some of the
same qualities as the logit model, and computation is only OLS. The drawback of the parsi-
monious model is the inability to incorporate unobserved consumer characteristics. Also, it
is not micro-founded, and therefore the estimation can be treated as ad hoc. When there is
29only one racial demographic in the precinct, and no other consumer characteristic including
unobserved consumer characteristic, the shares can be expressed in terms of mean-utility as:
lnsjt   ln(1   sjt)= jt + ↵r
where ↵r is the utility contribution of race r.F o ra l lp o s s i b l ed e m o g r a p h i e s ,t h em o r eg e n e r a l
speciﬁcation can be written as:
lnsjt   ln(1   sjt)= jt +
X
1r ⇤ ↵r
where 1r is indicator for race r. I can then extend it for the fractions of races. That is:
lnsjt   ln(1   sjt)= jt +
X
srt↵rt (1.5)
It is important to note that this is not a theoretically correct speciﬁcation, as the individual
shares need to be aggregated ﬁrst before applying the logit transformation rather than doing
aggregation over the logit transformation of the shares.
Written this way, the mean utility  jt once again becomes the error plus the constant
term. Table 1.3 presents the speciﬁcation, OLS, along with the Discrete Choice model.
The Discrete Choice model estimation is done two ways: one without unobserved consumer
characteristic, and the other – the Full Model – with the unobserved characteristic present.
In the OLS, the dependent variable is not (log of) share, but the logistic transformation. I
have included county ﬁxed eﬀects in all speciﬁcations to restrict the mean utility deviations
to be among precincts within a given county. All the coeﬃcients are precisely estimated. This
is due in part to having a large number of markets – the precincts. The negative coeﬃcient of
all the regressed demographics indicates that Whites have the highest probability of voting.
Other minority races are less likely to participate. The positive constant coeﬃcient shows
that Whites are more likely to vote than not to vote. This is not surprising, since they
30OLS ν = 0 OLS ν = 0 Full Model
Black -0.729** -0.955** -0.730** -0.891** -0.961**
(0.0426) (0.122)     (0.0437) (0.115) (0.074)
Asian -1.637** -1.694** -1.470** -1.538** -1.6951**
(0.0293) (0.051) (0.0296) (0.047) (0.046)
Hispanic -2.759** -3.082** -2.664** -2.973** -2.986**
(0.0193) (0.049) (0.0196) (0.047) (0.03)
Other -7.141** -14.635**
(0.222) (5.42)
ν 0.067
(0.0434)
Const 1.355** 1.184**
(0.0101) (0.00879)
N 18807 18807 18807 18807 18807
R-sq 0.536 0.511
Table 1.3. The Effect of Demographics on Going to Vote
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 
1%.
constitute the majority of the population and roughly 50% of Californians aged 18 and over
(75% of the registered voters) voted.44
For the remaining demographics, the sum of the constant and the beta coeﬃcient
determines their likelihood to vote. The average likelihood of voting doesn’t necessarily
imply the average ratio of voting share, as the latter would depend on precinct populations
and the mean utility terms. In my case, all other demographics are less likely to vote than
not to vote. This is perhaps a surprising ﬁnding for the Black population, as the media
consensus was an historic turnout of Black voters. Even though their turnout is higher than
that of Asians, Hispanics, and Others, I ﬁnd that it is much less than that of White voters.
More than half of the Black population living in California, though a lesser percentage of
44http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf
31registered Black voters, stayed home during the election. For a robustness check, I also
compare the Black turnout in 2008 to the turnout in the previous presidential election of
2004.
The Other population has a large negative coeﬃcient, suggesting that this group is
not made up of active voting participants. Their low participation translates to a statistically
very small contribution to the subsequent analysis of the presidential election and Prop 8. I
therefore combine the Other population with the White demographics. The estimates remain
roughly identical from this inclusion. I also tried including the Other population with other
demographics (e.g., the Black or Hispanic population) and the results again do not change.
I include the Other race with the White population as their total population will form the
baseline demographics to which the other demographic preferences will be compared. The
analysis is still robust despite the fact that, out of all demographics, the Whites are the most
likely to vote, and the Other population is the least likely to vote.
The Hispanic population also has a large negative coeﬃcient of participation. This
translates to Hispanics having a smaller share in total vote participation than the Asians,
even though there are three times more Hispanics than Asians in the population count. This
is consistent with many Hispanic residents not being eligible to vote, and it is heartening to
see the estimation picking up this eﬀect.45 It is interesting to note that the R-squared in
the OLS regression is almost 54%. Just the demographic component explains over half of
the variation in participation to vote. Adding the unobserved consumer characteristic will
improve the ﬁt of the model, as is also evident from the ﬁgures.
When comparing the imputed probabilities of going to vote across demographics to
the poll numbers, as shown in Table 1.4, I ﬁnd that the polls overestimate the participation of
Black and Hispanic voters, and underestimate the participation of White and Asian voters.
This is consistent with the intuitive results from Figure 1.3, and also lessens the magnitude
45The large negative coeﬃcient of Asian voters conforms with the anecdotal evidence that many remain
permanent residents and do not become citizens.
32Discrete Choice CNN Poll
White 70% 66%
Black 7% 10%
Asian 12% 6%
Hispanic 11% 18%
Table 1.4. Estimated Share of Voters by Demographics
of Black voters’ impact on Prop 8. To calculate the overall impact, I also need to calculate
the preferences over elections ballots, which I turn to next.
5.2 Presidential Election and Prop 8
I next calculate the shares for the two elections – Presidential race and Prop 8. Tables 1.5
and 1.6 report the results. The nested logit speciﬁces the relevant demographic shares as
the population of voters, and not the entire population of residents. In the estimation for
presidential election with no unobserved consumer characteristic, the preference for Black
voters for Democratic candidate, Obama, was problematic. As evident from Figure 1.1, the
share of votes for Obama quickly approaches 100% as the share of Black voters increases.
The precinct-speciﬁc mean utilities,  jt, are free-form to pick up any precinct-wide excess
preferences. However, even such general speciﬁcation is not enough to account for the strong
preference of Black voters for Obama. In the optimization, the coeﬃcient would approach
inﬁnity. This is especially problematic for calculation, as in the discrete choice setup, it would
involve taking the exponent of a very large number. To partly oﬀset the computations, I
instead compute the share of the Republican candidate, McCain. This still produces large
negative numbers for the Black population, but allows for the optimization to converge.46
46The computer handles e 1 better than e1.
33OLS ν = 0 Full Model
Black -4.008** -19.2112 -7.1176**
(0.0423) (598835.8) (0.2949)
Asian -0.950** -1.09778** -0.76015**
(0.0384) (0.0294) (0.0635)
Hispanic -1.245** -1.77063** -.92331**
(0.0320) (0.0238) (0.2695)
ν -0.3527**
(0.0956)
Const -0.0713**
(0.00852)
N 18807 18807 18807
R-sq 0.391
Table 1.5. The Effect of Demographics on Presidential 
Candidate Choices
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of votes for the Republican Candidate 
(McCain). Standard errors are in parentheses. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 
5%; ** Significant at 1%.
The large numbers are still problematic in calculations for standard errors, as the multinomial
standard errors are divided by the square of the shares, thus making the variance for the Black
coeﬃcient especially large. The Full Model speciﬁcation does not suﬀer from such estimation
issues, in part because even with strong preference, the presence of another random variable
reduces the choice probability to strictly between 0 and 1.
In the presidential election, the preferences for Black, Asian and Hispanic demograph-
ics are strongly for Obama. It is interesting to note that, with the correct speciﬁcation of
demographic shares, I show all races being pro-Obama. This is consistent with the CNN
poll ﬁndings. The R-squared in the OLS is almost 40%, indicating that demographics alone
34OLS ν = 0 Full Model
Black 0.281** 0.32022** 0.8764**
(0.0409) (0.022691) (0.0981)
Asian -0.0482 -0.03363+ -0.43205**
(0.0371) (0.022176) (0.1472)
Hispanic 1.176** 1.1973** 1.3534**
(0.0309) (0.025678) (0.04438)
ν 0.7085**
(0.01068)
Const -0.0567**
(0.00823)
N 18807 18807 18807
R-sq 0.079
Table 1.6. The Effect of Demographics on 
Proposition 8 Choices
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of Yes votes on Proposition 8. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; 
** Significant at 1%.
35Discrete Choice CNN Poll
Black 57% 70%
Asian 49.1% 49%
Hispanic 74.4% 53%
White 48.5% 49%
Table 1.7. Imputed and Poll Probabilities of Voting Yes on Prop 8
is a strong enough predictor for preference for the presidential candidate.
From Table 1.7, the Prop 8 estimate predictions on the voting preference match
almost exactly with the CNN poll estimates for Asian and White demographics. They are
both slightly in favor of voting No on Prop 8. For the Black and Hispanic demographics the
results, however, vary from the CNN poll. Similar to the poll results, I ﬁnd strong preference
of both demographic groups to vote Yes on Prop 8. The magnitudes however, are diﬀerent
from the polls. I ﬁnd that the Black voters are less inclined to vote Yes on Prop 8, and the
Hispanics are, in turn, more inclined to vote Yes, than is suggested by the poll results. This
ﬁnding, combined with the fact that more Hispanic voters participated in the election than
did Black voters, suggests that they were more pivotal in the passing of Prop 8 than the
Black voters.
5.3 Robustness and Counterfactual Analysis
As a robustness check, I also analyze the 2004 voter turnout and presidential elections in
California. Table 1.8 reports the results. The coeﬃcients for Black voter turnout are very
similar to the 2008 estimates. This shows that Black voter turnout, relative to Whites, was
not higher in 2008 compared to the prior presidential election. Of course, that can still
be consistent with the fact that more Black voters took part in the 2008 election, if more
people in general, including Black voters, participated in the elections in 2008. This can
36be seen by a larger constant coeﬃcient, implying that more baseline White voters went to
vote in 2008. Convergence for discrete choice setup with no unobserved characteristic is
no longer an issue for the 2004 results, owing to the fact that 2004 Democratic nominee
Kerry was not as popular among Blacks as was Obama. Another interesting ﬁnding is the
larger support for the Republican nominee by the Hispanic demographics in 2004 than in
2008. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that 2004 Republican nominee Bush
was more popular among Hispanics than subsequent Republican candidates, McCain and
Romney.
Would Prop 8 have passed without a presidential election on the same ballot? The
setup’s main advantages include counterfactual analysis: having a micro-founded framework
allows one to estimate diﬀerences when the underlying components change. By analyzing
going to multiple elections, one can look at alternative consumer behavior when some of the
possibilities are eliminated. I look at the voter turnout and the total votes for Proposition 8,
without the presidential election on the ticket. The setup would be similar to voting on Prop
8 during a midterm election year. I ﬁnd that voter turnout is lower – at 40.8%. This is much
less than the reported turnout of close to 50%, and is more in line with midterm election
turnout. This further signiﬁes the important role that presidential elections play on turnout,
and it is encouraging to see reasonable estimates from the counterfactual. It is important
to note that such analysis would not be possible with the single election framework, as each
election is independent from others, meaning that results will not change with elimination
(or addition) of diﬀerent elections.
More interestingly, I also ﬁnd that Proposition 8 would gather only 49.3% of the
vote. It would, therefore, most likely fail to pass. The results are driven by participation in
elections, which is explicitly modeled and accounted for in my setup. Certain minorities, such
as Blacks and Hispanics, were in favor of both Obama and Proposition 8. Eliminating the
presidential ticket on the ballot would drop the mean aggregate utility from elections below
the participation threshold for some of them. If previously, they had a strong preference to
37vote for Obama and Proposition 8 versus not going to vote, their decision is now reduced to
voting only on Proposition 8 versus not going to vote. A share of the population who have
participated before would therefore stay home on election night. I ﬁnd that enough people
in favor of Prop 8 abstain from voting, compared to those voting No on Prop 8, which tips
the scale against passing Proposition 8.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The paper develops a methodology to impute bundles of product choices from only the
aggregate market shares. I also provide identiﬁcation when there is no product variation
across markets. I show my estimation is consistent with BLP assumptions of discrete choice
analysis. I use the methodology to analyze the voting outcome for 2008 California elections.
More speciﬁcally, I look at the voting preferences on presidential election and Prop 8 ballots,
for each demographic group. I ﬁnd that the participation of the Black population is largely
exaggerated in the media, based on the exit polls, and they were more likely not to go to vote
than to vote. Their results are largely consistent with the estimates from the 2004 General
Election. There is a very strong preference of the Black voters for presidential candidate
Obama, consistent with the poll results. However, I ﬁnd that the preference of the Black
population for choosing Yes on Prop 8 is not as high as suggested by the polls. The Hispanic
population is more likely to vote Yes, than the Black population. This, coupled with the
fact that more Hispanics voted in the 2008 election that did Blacks, suggests that the role
of the Black population in helping pass Prop 8 is largely exaggerated.
Further extensions to this paper would be to expand the model to include possible
correlations between diﬀerent markets. In my setup, I can include a parameter   that shows
the correlation between each of the choices of the nest. The implementation is straightforward
and allows an arbitrary level of substitution between choices (Berry 1994, Cardell 1997, Einav
2007). One reason is to see how substitutable election choices are relative to each other and
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39across elections. In American politics, there is evidence that such strong preferences do not
constitute the majority of the electorate. A large number of voters are in fact independent,
and election campaigns are mainly targeted to attract those votes. Incorporating correlation
can provide an empirical estimation of voter polarization, as my model can be set up to
account for the correlation through the   coeﬃcient.
Perhaps an even more far-reaching analysis would be to extend the voting outcome
on gerrymandering. The unique nature of gerrymandering is that voting districts are con-
structed by the state legislature to conform to certain requirements, such as the Voting
Rights Act (1965). The general permission to pattern in any speciﬁc shape has resulted in
some uniquely shaped districts. Gerrymandering is typically done at the state level, by state
legislatures. Voters, however, mostly go to elections to vote for national candidates. My
analysis can help answer the question of the extent that gerrymandering is aﬀected by such
as e t u p .A l s o ,h o wd ol o c a lc a n d i d a t e so p t i m i z et h e i re l e c t a b i l i t yt h r o u g hg e r r y m a n d e r i n g ,
knowing that voter turnout is largely driven by more national candidates and issues? This
is left for future work.
40Chapter 2
Do Policies Aﬀect Preferences? Evidence
from Random Variation in Abortion
Jurisprudence (joint with Daniel Chen
and Susan Yeh)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Do government policies shift policy preferences? This question is important to optimal policy
design and central to political economy. Social scientists have long speculated about the role
of laws in motivating broader societal change. Yet little population-based causal evidence
exists on why people obey the law; whether it is because legal sanctions alone motivate
behavioral changes, as in a classical economic framework, or because the law psychologically
motivates behavioral changes through moral or expressive messages. To date, behavioral
theorists have focused primarily on the expressive eﬀects of public policy,47 where laws that
express societal values draw people’s preferences closer to the social norm.48 Yet an extensive
literature, largely anecdotal or qualitative in nature (see, e.g., Roe 1998 and Klarman 2005),
47A notable exception is Benabou and Tirole (2011).
48See Benabou and Tirole (2011) and the references therein for a theoretical and empirical literature.has linked policy backlash to almost every policy.49 Formal theory is ambiguous as to the
eﬀect of government policy on individuals’ policy preferences. Our analysis provides causal
evidence for understanding why some normative arrangements are considered repugnant,
and may help in policy design (Mankiw and Weinzierl 2010).
Little empirical work using naturally occurring data has addressed when and why
law has expressive or backlash eﬀects, despite their frequent use in justifying one law over
another.50 We deﬁne backlash in the policy context as causing people’s preferences to shift
away from what the law expresses. Our model allows for the possibility for both backlash and
expressive eﬀects taking place in society. As is borne out in the data, we ﬁnd initial backlash
eﬀects to appellate decisions, followed by expressive eﬀects. There are two mechanisms
through which actions are controlled: external (exogenous) probability, which is determined
by laws and establishments, and internal (endogenous) probability, which is determined by
the perceptions the agent takes towards actions. The dynamics of such a setup allows for
both backlash and expressive eﬀects to be displayed over time.
Persuasive empirical evidence on how policies aﬀect preferences has been limited,
partly due to the diﬃculty of identifying policy shocks that are exogenous. We introduce
an instrumental variables approach to these problems and apply our method in the context
of abortion regulation.51 As prima facie evidence of the possibility of backlash, consider
that the number of state abortion restrictions have increased over time since the landmark
Supreme Court Roe v. Wade decision.52 At i m e - s e r i e so rp a n e la n a l y s i si sl i m i t e db e c a u s e
legal decisions are likely endogenous to social changes. We address this issue by focusing on
court decisions in US appellate courts, which determine a signiﬁcant portion of cases that
49For a sample, see: voter mobilization (Mann 2010), multiculturalism (Mitchell 2004), environmentalism
(Wolf 1995), private infrastructure investments (Lopez et al. 2009), health care (Mechanic 2001), abortion
(Pridemore and Freilich 2007), Americans with Disabilities Act (Krieger 2000), globalization (Eckes 2000),
Warren Court (Feld 2003).
50See Funk (2010) for an exception.
51Chen and Yeh (2012) examines the impact of obscenity law on preferences.
52http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-state-of-roe-v-wade-in-9-
charts/2012/01/23/gIQAXo6XLQ_gallery.html?hpid=z2#photo=5
42shape the abortion law in the United States. This eﬀective making-of-law occurs because
decisions become precedents for decisions in future cases. We isolate an unexpected compo-
nent of appellate jurisprudence using the random assignment of appellate judges to cases.
We demonstrate that the idiosyncratic variation in the proportion of cases with Democratic
appointees is a strong predictor of liberal outcomes in abortion cases. We use this random
variation to identify the causal impact of policy outcomes on policy preferences.
Our research design can be clariﬁed through the following thought experiment. Con-
sider the Ninth Circuit, a generally more liberal court that includes California, which has a
high proportion of judges who are Democratic appointees. From year to year, the propor-
tion of abortion cases that are assigned Democratic appointees varies in a random manner.
The idiosyncratic variation is not expected ahead of time since judicial assignments are not
revealed to parties until very late and after each litigant’s briefs are ﬁled. In years with an
unexpectedly high proportion of cases heard by a Democratic appointee, the proportion of
abortion cases that will result in liberal precedents is also high. Random variation in the
assignment of appellate judges is an attractive instrument for a number of reasons. The ran-
dom assignment of judges is exogenous and unexpected. It varies in both the cross-section
and the time-series, so does not rely on strong assumptions about the comparability of dif-
ferent regions (e.g., circuits) and years. Additionally, the exclusion restriction is likely to
hold: The idiosyncratic variation in the proportion of abortion cases with particular judge
characteristics is unlikely to directly aﬀect society-wide outcomes except through the appel-
late precedent alone. The enormous variation in abortion decisions due to the judicial panel
composition also makes our empirical design an ideal context to study the eﬀect of policies
on preferences. Abortion decisions are decided along partisan lines, are highly emotionally
salient, and are likely to aﬀect individuals through more than economic sanctions alone.
We ﬁnd that Democratic appointee judges are 17 percentage points more likely to
vote “pro-choice” in abortion decisions. Using the idiosyncratic variation in judicial panel
composition as an instrument, our baseline estimates indicate that one pro-choice abortion
43decision increases the probability of individuals saying abortion should not be legal by 4 to
10 percentage points. Pro-life decisions increase the likelihood that individuals say abortion
should be legal. The eﬀect of pro-life abortion decisions is larger than the eﬀect of pro-choice
abortion decisions. In addition, one pro-choice abortion decision increases by 3 percentage
points the likelihood of individuals identifying as a strong Republican and reduces by 3
percentage points the likelihood of individuals identifying as an Independent, near Democrat.
Party identiﬁcation shifts to becoming more Democratic after a pro-life decision. We conduct
several robustness checks. Public opinions and party identiﬁcation are not correlated with the
idiosyncratic variation in abortion jurisprudence stemming from panel composition before the
decision. In addition, as a placebo experiment, liberal jurisprudence in the First Amendment
does not aﬀect abortion attitudes.
To examine one mechanism through which appellate decisions aﬀect policy prefer-
ences, we document that newspapers subsequently report abortion appellate decisions and
conduct a ﬁeld experiment where 345 data-entry workers are randomly asked to transcribe
these newspaper summaries of liberal or conservative abortion decisions. When exposed to
liberal abortion decisions, workers become more conservative (and vice versa) on two di-
mensions of abortion attitudes and the shift is similar in magnitude to the estimates in the
population sample.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on appellate courts and
their decision-making process. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework for policy
preference shifts including backlash and expressive. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5e x p l a i n st h ee m p i r i c a ls t r a t e g ya n dt h r e a t st ot h ev a l i d i t yo ft h ei d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o ns t r a t e g y .
Section 6 presents the results, showing the robust ﬁrst-stage relationship between judicial
panel composition and abortion decisions, discussing the main instrumental variable results
and the results of several robustness tests. Section 7 describes the priming experiment.
Section 8 concludes.
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2.1 The Federal Judicial System and Abortion Policy
Federal appellate decisions concerning abortion rights and abortion access can act both
as policy changes and as statements of policy and values. To understand policy-making
by courts regarding abortion, we describe the system of abortion regulation in the United
States, and the crucial role of the US federal court system in abortion policy.
Abortion policy in the United States is represented at several levels. In the seminal
1973 Roe v. Wade decision, the US Supreme Court found that constitutional due process
rights extend to individual abortions, but any abortion regulations must be balanced with
state interests. In the controversial aftermath, states may not completely prohibit abortion
but have discretion to regulate it, subject to review by the courts. This discretion has led to
much variation in abortion policy across states and localities. Laws on whether a woman can
get an abortion can be codiﬁed in state statutes and local ordinances, as well as in regulations
by government agencies. While there is no single comprehensive federal statute on abortion, a
handful of federal laws target speciﬁc components of access to abortions.53 At the state level,
statutory provisions can impose various criteria on women seeking abortions as well as on
abortion providers.54 Other state laws address the public funding of abortions; for example,
a majority of states disallow the use of state funds for abortions except when the woman’s
life is in danger or if the pregnancy was the result of incest or rape.55 At the local level,
cities can impose additional ordinances on abortion access and provision. While governments
53Among these are Title X, enacted in 1970, which allocates federal funding to family planning services
for low income persons but does not directly fund abortions; the Hyde Amendment, enacted in 1976, which
bars Medicaid for funding abortions; the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, which made it
af e d e r a lc r i m et ob l o c ki n d i v i d u a l s ’a c c e s st oc l i n i c s ;a n dt h eP a r t i a lB i r t hA b o r t i o nB a nA c to f2 0 0 3 ,w h i c h
bans late-term abortions.
54Examples include requiring parental consent or notiﬁcation for minors (36 states), gestational limits
that forbid abortions after a speciﬁed period into a pregnancy (38 states), and imposing speciﬁc licensing
requirements on clinics and physicians.
55An overview of state-level abortion laws is available at:
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
45have discretion in enacting their own abortion laws, they must not conﬂict with laws of a
higher level (e.g., federal statutes) and they must meet constitutional requirements, which
are determined by the courts. Therefore, the federal appellate courts play a prominent role
in determining abortion policy by adjudicating legal challenges against government statutes
and deciding whether they are unenforceable.
To illustrate how appellate decisions shape abortion law and to provide background
for our empirical methods, we note several key features of the US legal system. First, the US
has a common law system where judges both apply the law as well as make the law. This
judicial lawmaking occurs as judges’ decisions in current cases become precedents that must
guide decisions in future cases within the jurisdiction. Second, the federal courts system
consists of three levels. Litigation, such as a lawsuit asserting that government-mandated
waiting periods for an abortion procedure are unenforceable, begins in the district courts, or
the general trial courts. On appeal, cases go to appellate courts, referred to as circuit courts,
which examine whether the district court was in error and, importantly, decide issues of new
law. (A very small portion of these cases is appealed again to the Supreme Court.)
Appellate law varies by geography. Each of the twelve appellate courts is in charge
of a geographic region of the US, called a circuit. Appellate decisions are binding precedents
only in the circuit of the court delivering the opinion. That is, the district courts within
that circuit, and the circuit court itself, must follow the precedents set by the circuit court’s
prior decisions; courts in one circuit need not follow precedents from other circuits. In this
way, appellate decisions provide geographic variation in laws across the circuits, analogous
to variations in legislation across the states.
Finally, judges are randomly assigned to three-judge appellate panels to decide cases.
While some judges take a reduced caseload, all judges are randomly assigned by a computer.
The judges’ identities typically are not revealed to the litigating parties until after they
ﬁle their briefs. Because a circuit on average has 17 appellate judges in the pool of judges
available to be assigned (and some circuits can have over 40 judges), the number of possible
46combinations of judges and their individual attributes on a panel is very large. Judges’
personal attributes, such as gender and political aﬃliation, can predict their votes on certain
types of cases.56 Moreover, the dynamics of panel decision-making reveal that assigning
one judge with a speciﬁc attribute can potentially inﬂuence the overall decision of the 3-
judge panel.57 Indeed, we establish these voting behaviors for abortion cases, ﬁnding that
assigning a Democratic appointee increases the probability of a liberal, pro-choice abortion
case outcome.
Together, these features of the federal court system are important in constructing a
natural experiment with random variation in abortion precedents across regions of the US
and over time. Circuit court decisions form abortion policy by setting legal precedents that
become the law of the circuit and by aﬃrming or invalidating government regulations. In
abortion cases, the bulk of constitutional challenges concern the validity of statutes, ordi-
nances, and regulations implemented by governments. Thus, circuit court abortion decisions,
which we ﬁnd to be linked to the political ideology of randomly assigned judges (see Section
6), can directly aﬀect codiﬁed policies on abortion rights while setting legal precedent for
future abortion decisions.
2.2 The Communication of Social Norms with Abortion Decisions
Beyond serving as actual law, circuit court decisions can simply reveal positions on highly
sensitive issues, which can motivate backlash or support. Ruling that a local ordinance is in
violation of constitutional rights can in itself be an announcement of a value judgment about
the acceptable scope of abortion rights. Are people aware of appellate abortion decisions?
Studies have linked major, controversial Supreme Court decisions, such as Roe v. Wade,
with subsequent changes in public opinions about abortion (Franklin and Kosaki 1989) and
have suggested that the media, as well as other factors, can predict people’s awareness of
56Boyd et al. (2010); Chang and Schoar (2008); Sunstein et al. (2004); Peresie (2005).
57Farhang and Wawro (2004); Fischman (2007)
47these decisions (Hoekstra 2000).
Exploring the media channel, we examine how appellate abortion decisions are com-
municated to the public by using a national sample of newspapers and collecting their men-
tions of appellate decisions over time. Hoekstra (2000) suggests that local media are more
likely to report on cases in their community and that local residents are more likely to be
aware of those cases than cases in other jurisdictions. We therefore select the major newspa-
per for the city in which each circuit court resides.58 Figure 2.1 plots the number of appellate
decisions on abortion and the number of news articles on abortion decisions for 1979-2004.59
Controlling for circuit and year ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the
number of abortion decisions and the number of newspaper mentions; and the relationship
between the number of pro-life decisions and newspaper mentions is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
3T h e o r y
The theoretical framework is intended to assist in understanding when laws have expressive
eﬀects as opposed to backlash eﬀects. Scholars in a wide range of areas have made arguments
for or against certain policies on the basis of their expressive or backlash eﬀects but without
ac l e a rf r a m e w o r kf o ra s s e s s i n gt h el i k e l i h o o do ft h e i ro c c u r r e n c e . 60 We present a model of
58These newspapers are: the Boston Globe, New York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Richmond Times Dis-
patch, Times-Picayune, Cincinnati Post, Chicago Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle,
Denver Post, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, and Washington Post. We collected data from 1979 to 2010
from NewsBank using the search term: “abortion in All Text and appellate or circuit in All Text and
judgment or "court ruling" in All Text not "Supreme Court" in All Text not state near10 appellate in All
Text”
59Not every newspaper is available for every year. In our model, we include circuit and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
In the ﬁgure, we divide the number of newspaper articles by the proportion of newspapers available. For
example, if in 1980, only half of the typical newspaper coverage is available because of data limitations, we
divide by 0.5. This allows us to compare graphically the number of appellate decisions and news articles
about abortion cases over time.
60For a sample of backlash claims, see: voter mobilization (Mann 2010), multiculturalism (Mitchell 2004),
environmentalism (Wolf 1995), private infrastructure investments (Lopez et al. 2009), health care (Mechanic
2001), abortion (Pridemore and Freilich 2007), Americans with Disabilities Act (Krieger 2000), globalization
(Eckes 2000), Warren Court (Feld 2003).
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49initial backlash and subsequent expressive eﬀects of attitudes. At the heart of the model is
the interplay of external factors (laws) and internal factors (perceptions) that come together
to minimize the probability of certain actions happening. Changing of laws aﬀects the
optimal level of perceptions, creating a backlash eﬀect. Over time, as the distribution of
the population with respect to the action changes, the backlash eﬀect can change into an
expressive eﬀect. The model also does not depend on the observability of actions (or their
perceptions), as it might be diﬃcult to accurately observe abortions in the society.
For the setup we start with a representative agent. The agent may face an abortion
opportunity at date t =1 .I ft h ep e r s o nd o e sn o tu n d e r t a k ea b o r t i o n ,t h eu t i l i t yi sn o r m a l i z e d
to 0. The representative agent’s net (expected) utility of having an abortion is negative,
 ua < 0,r e l a t i v et ot h es t a t u sq u o .( S o m ep e o p l em a yr e c e i v ep o s i t i v eu t i l i t yf r o ma b o r t i o n ,
but overall, in the representative agent framework, it is a safe assumption that the average
expected utility will be negative, an outcome that agents would like to avoid). Analogously,
we assume that once the person has had an abortion there will be no subsequent changes
in utility (or utility expectation) from more abortion undertakings. We can then normalize
the utility of those that have already had an abortion to 0, as well. The share of those not
having previously had an abortion is s in the society. (Since only women can have abortions,
we assume that the choices by men in the society can also lead to abortion outcomes, which
will result in negative utility, on average, for the men as well.)
The probability of the abortion depends on two factors: the outside (exogenous)
factor q,a n dt h ei n t e r n a l( e n d o g e n o u s )f a c t o rp. q measures the overall state of the society,
and depends on, among other things, the laws and the establishments currently in place in
the society. The internal factor p depends on the actions the person takes at date t =0to
avoid abortion at t =1 . There are convex costs c(p) to avoid abortion: c0 > 0,c 00 > 0.F o r
our setup, we generalize and call such actions “negative perceptions” towards abortion. (Or
alternatively, there is a 1:1 translation of actions into perceptions). That is, the higher the
person’s negative attitude towards abortion, the lower the (individual) probability of facing
50those actions, and vice versa.
The overall probability of abortion is given by: eq p.H i g h e re x t e r n a lf a c t o r si n c r e a s e
abortion probability and larger negative perceptions decrease it. If the agent has already
had an abortion, the positive costs ensure that they will not undertake any positive level
of negative perceptions: p =0 . Thus, the overall amount of negative perceptions towards
abortion in the society will be sp.
For the agents not having faced abortion previously, the equilibrium level of abortion
will be determined by:
max
p {
 
e
q p 
( ua)   c(p)}
We can normalize the costs c(p) by ua, and, by slight abuse of notation, rewrite the
new costs again as c(p),t os i m p l i f yt h ee q u a t i o nt ob e :
max
p { e
q p   c(p)}
The FOC yields:
e
q p⇤
= c
0(p
⇤)
Or,
q = p
⇤ +l nc
0(p
⇤)
The right-hand side of the equation is monotone increasing in p, which implies
@p⇤
@q > 0.
Also, from the implicit function theorem, we have:
1=
@p⇤
@q
+
c00(p⇤)
c0(p⇤)
@p⇤
@q
>
@p⇤
@q
Thus, 0 <
@p⇤
@q < 1.
51This gives the initial backlash eﬀect in the society. Namely, passing of pro-choice law,
represented by increase in q, will raise the overall exogenous probability of abortions taking
place in the society at date t =0 . This implies that a rise in q will also raise the overall level
of negative perceptions sp⇤, which is done to partially oﬀset the increase in q.
To look at subsequent expressive eﬀect, ﬁrst note that even without any law, in the
steady state equilibrium, there will be some positive ratio of abortion taking place in the
society. To assume net 0 steady state change in abortions, let s0 = eq p⇤
0,a n da s s u m et h e
overall level probability of abortion next period will be eq p   s0, where p⇤
0 is the initial
equilibrium level of negative perceptions. This lump-sum value s0 will not aﬀect marginal
conditions, and in equilibrium, in expectation, there will be 0 abortions.
In general, when the law changes, the share of society in period t =1with no abortions
will equal s 
 
eq p⇤   s0
 
= s+s0  eq p⇤. Thus, the overall level of negative perception in
the economy will equal:
 
s + s0   eq p⇤ 
p⇤. The partial with respect to q will equal:
(s + s0)
@p⇤
@q
  e
q p⇤@p⇤
@q
  p
⇤e
q p⇤
✓
1  
@p⇤
@q
◆
From the bounds on
@p⇤
@q we know that the last two expressions are negative, whereas
the ﬁrst one is positive. Moreover, from the First Order Condition, we know that eq p⇤ =
c0(p⇤). Therefore, a suﬃcient (though not necessary) condition for the expression in the
equation to be negative is for c0(p⇤)   s + s0. That is, for suﬃciently large marginal costs,
the equilibrium level of overall negative perceptions in the society will be decrease at t =1 ,
meaning that the society turns from backlash to expressive towards the law. This happens
due to the fact that even though the average level of negative perceptions increases, the
number of such people in the society decreases. For large-enough marginal costs, it is possible
for the product to decrease in equilibrium.
The intuition lies in the strength of costs to change perceptions, relative to other
factors in the economy, like laws. If the costs are relatively low to change perceptions, then
any change in law could be internalized, to a greater extent, through perception. This will
52create persistent backlash eﬀect. However, if marginal costs are large enough, the change
in law will have a sizable impact on the actual number of people getting versus not-getting
an abortion. It is intuitive to think of laws that may initially be unpopular, to develop
expressive eﬀects through increasing the share of the population to do those actions that the
law condones.
4D a t a
4.1 Judicial Biographies
We compile our data from three main sources. We use federal appellate-level abortion
decisions originally coded by Sunstein et al. (2006), with corrections by Kastellec (2013).
We match each judge who adjudicated the cases with judge data from the Federal Appeals
and District Court Attribute Data assembled by Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski61 as well as from
the Federal Judicial Center’s biographies of judges.62 We measure preference shifts using
data on political attitudes and abortion opinions from the General Social Survey (GSS).
Our set of abortion decisions consists of 143 published opinions on abortion that were
decided between January 1, 1971 and June 30, 2004, at the federal appellate level.63 The
cases are limited to those decided on constitutional grounds. These largely consist of chal-
lenges to state statutes, local ordinances, or other government policies regulating abortion
access. Examples include parental notiﬁcation or consent requirements for minors seek-
ing abortions,64 prohibitions on state funding for abortions,65 and “partial-birth” abortion
61http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm
62http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf
63Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman (2006) obtain these cases from a broader Lexis search using the terms
“core-terms (abortion) and date aft 1960 and constitutional” and “abortion and constitution!”
64See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir., 1981);
Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir., 1997); Planned Parenthood Of Northern New England v. Heed,
390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir., 2004).
65See, e.g., D R v. Mitchell, 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir., 1981); State of New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401
(2nd Cir., 1989)
53bans.66 As m a l lp o r t i o no ft h ec a s e sr e p r e s e n t sc h a l l e n g e st or e s t r i c t i o n so na n t i - a b o r t i o n
protesting.67 Appendix Table A gives a rough summary of the challenges to statutes and
policies that reached the Supreme Court. A total of 117 circuit-years of the 408 circuit-years
in our time period experienced at least one abortion decision.
Each decision was coded as either “pro-choice,” favoring abortion rights and stronger
protections from anti-abortion protest methods, or “pro-life.” In this paper, we sometimes
refer to pro-choice decisions as “liberal” and pro-life decisions as “conservative.” Among the
years with any abortion appellate decisions, 58% of the panel decisions were pro-choice,
with 80% of these pro-choice decisions being unanimous. Of the pro-life decisions, 65%
were unanimous. Figure 2.2 plots the frequency of pro-choice decisions and pro-life decisions
nationwide in appellate courts by year.
Each appellate case was decided by a panel of three randomly assigned federal judges.68
A key feature of our identiﬁcation strategy relies on judicial pool characteristics, where we
observe judge characteristics to predict votes and case decisions. We match each judge to
her or his individual biographical attributes from Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski’s Appeals Court
Attribute Data and District Court Attribute Data, as well as biographical data from the
Federal Judicial Center for judges appointed after 2000. The data include a judge’s vital
statistics, education, religion, race, political aﬃliation and other variables. For a number of
speciﬁcations, we use the Federal Court Management Statistics to construct a measure of
the annual circuit workload, or the number of federal appeals terminated within each circuit
by year.69
We obtain outcome measures of individuals’ abortion views and political ideology
66See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir., 1999); Rhode Island Medical Society v. White-
house, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir., 2001).
67See, e.g., Cheﬀer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir., 1995); US v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir., 2000).
68Most are federal appellate-level judges, though some are district court judges who sit within the case’s
circuit.
69http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html
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55from the General Social Survey (GSS).70 The GSS is an individual-level survey that was
conducted annually from 1973 to 1994 (except for 1979, 1981, and 1992), and biannually
from 1994 to 2006. For each year, the GSS randomly selects a cross-sectional sample of
residents of the United States who are at least 18 years old. The GSS provides responses
from around 1500 respondents for each survey year between 1973 and 1992, and around 2900
respondents per survey year from 1994 to 2006. We shift the survey responses by one year
because people can be surveyed at any time during the year. We use GSS survey weights in
our regressions.
4.2 Summary Statistics
Appendix Table B shows the summary statistics. Means of appellate court characteristics are
shown for the judicial pool at the circuit and year level. Of the 408 circuit-years between 1971
and 2004, 117 circuit-years experienced at least one appellate abortion decision. On average,
ac i r c u i t - y e a rh a s1 6 . 8a c t i v e( a p p e l l a t e )j u d g e s ,0 . 3 5a p p e l l a t ea b o r t i o nd e c i s i o n s ,a n d0 . 2 0 3
pro-choice decisions. Thus, the majority of abortion cases had pro-choice outcomes. Of the
GSS respondents experiencing an abortion decision and surveyed on their abortion views,
around 80% believe that a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if her health
is seriously endangered by the pregnancy, while only 40% believe so if the woman wants
an abortion for any reason. On self-identiﬁed political aﬃliation, 48% lean towards being a
Democrat, while 36% lean towards being a Republican.
5E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
We ﬁrst present a basic speciﬁcation of the eﬀects of appellate abortion laws on political
preferences. This naïve OLS model controls for various sources of biases arising from time
and place. However, it can be susceptible to reverse causality as well as omitted variable
70http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gssbeta/index.html
56biases arising from outside trends. Indeed, constituents can inﬂuence the types of policies in
their jurisdictions to satisfy their preferences.71 Later, we present our identiﬁcation strategy,
which overcomes the endogeneity of policy and preferences. We exploit exogenous variation
from a natural experiment where liberal abortion decisions vary randomly across circuits
and over time due to the random assignment of judges to appellate panels.
5.1 Basic Speciﬁcation
Our basic speciﬁcation models the changes in abortion precedent at the circuit-year level
and their relationship to individual political preferences as:
Yict =  0+ 1Lawct+ 21[Mct > 0]+ 3Cc+ 4Tt+ 5Cc⇤Y ear+ 6Xict+ 7Wct+"ict (2.1)
The dependent variable, Yict,i sam e a s u r eo ft h ep r e f e r e n c e so fi n d i v i d u a li in circuit c
and year t. These include value judgments about abortion rights and political ideology.
The main coeﬃcient of interest is  1 on Lawct, where Lawct is the measure of liberal, pro-
choice abortion decisions issued in circuit c and year t.W ec o n s t r u c tt h i sa st h ep e r c e n t a g e
of abortion decisions that are liberal (pro-choice). This captures the net eﬀect of liberal
decisions given that conservative decisions may also occur. In alternate speciﬁcations, we
measure the law as the raw number of liberal decisions, and then as the raw number of
conservative (pro-life) decisions. With these, we test whether a higher quantity of liberal
abortion decisions would produce backlash; the number of conservative decisions also serves
as a robustness check.
The presence of the case variable, 1[Mct > 0], allows for the possibility that pro-choice
and pro-life decisions might have eﬀects of diﬀerent magnitudes on the dependent variable.
It also enables us to construct the decision variable for circuits and years with multiple legal
71See Besley and Case (2000).
57decisions. The presence of the case, however is endogenous and is likely to be correlated with
the error term. We instrument for 1[Mct > 0] with the random assignment of district court
judges to their cases. Recall from Section 2.1 that appellate cases appear only on appeal from
the district court. Thus random variation in the district courts serves to hold the ﬁtted values
of 1[Mct > 0] to vary in a manner that no longer threatens the moment condition in our
speciﬁcation. One district court judge is randomly assigned per case (Bird 1975).72 Figure
2.3 displays the boundaries of each district court with dashed lines. Whether the district
court cases were disproportionately assigned to certain types of judges will be uncorrelated
with treatment (the random assignment of appellate judges) but may aﬀect the likelihood of
subsequent appeal. As a general matter, district judges could aﬀect the likelihood of appeal,
for example, if some district judges are less likely to be reversed and this lower reversal
rate discourages litigating parties from pursuing an appeal. The correlation between district
judge demographic characteristics and their reversal rates has been previously documented
(Barondes 2010; Steinbuch 2009; Haire, Songer and Lindquist 2003).
Observed diﬀerences in policy preferences might arise from regional traditions rather
than from the laws themselves. For example, church attendance may be more ingrained in the
culture of a Southern circuit, so people there may express more conservative attitudes than
people on the West Coast. We address potential biases arising across time and space with
controls: Cc is the vector of circuit ﬁxed eﬀects, which absorb circuit-level unobservables; Tt
is the vector of year ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for year-speciﬁc unobservables that equally
aﬀect all circuits; and Cc*Year are the circuit-speciﬁc time trends to allow diﬀerent circuits
to be on diﬀerent trajectories with respect to outcomes. We also include state ﬁxed eﬀects
to address state-speciﬁc characteristics; these would capture state statutes and state court
decisions. Xict is the vector of observable individual characteristics such as age and gender.
Because political attitudes may be correlated by space so that "ict is not i.i.d., we cluster
72We use only cases decided by district court judges and exclude recommendations by magistrate judges
because litigants cannot directly appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation (28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)).
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59standard errors at the circuit level. Finally, Wct represents judicial pool controls, such as the
circuit-speciﬁc docket size or the total number of abortion cases. The particular variables
included in the judicial pool controls depend on speciﬁcation, which we discuss in the next
sub-section.
Are estimates from the model plausible? One critique is that decisions in one circuit
may inﬂuence another circuit towards the same direction. Second, appellate case selec-
tion may be correlated with trends in the lower courts; for example, more liberal appellate
decisions can occur when the trial courts are extremely conservative.73 These behaviors,
however, would merely contribute measurement error, attenuating the magnitudes toward
zero or generating imprecision. A third critique concerns residential sorting: People who are
pro-choice may choose to locate in jurisdictions with more liberal political attitudes. Our
circuit ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for time trends within circuits could address this. A fourth
critique is that litigants engage in forum-shopping. Forum-shopping, however, is addressed
by controlling for the total number of abortion cases.
5.2 Remarks
Before moving on to extensions of the basic model, we make two remarks. First, the exclusion
restriction is likely to hold, and we will thus be able to interpret the 2SLS estimates as the
causal impact of abortion precedent. Here, the identity of judges sitting on abortion panels
is not likely directly to aﬀect population outcomes that are of interest except through the
appellate precedent alone. In ongoing research, we ﬁnd that markets do not respond to the
judge announcement, even in a set of securities cases in Delaware courts where markets are
likely to have focused their attention. Second, the LATE interpretation of the instrumental
variables estimate is restricted in terms of external validity. Here, only cases where there
is enough controversy to allow judicial biographical characteristics to matter are going to
be the subject of the study. These cases may very well be the diﬃcult decisions that set
73See, e.g. Priest and Klein (1984); Eisenberg (1990).
60new precedent, and the sorts of cases in which judges, like Judge Richard Posner or Justice
Stephen Breyer, interested in empirical consequences of decisions, seek guidance (Posner
1998; Breyer 2006).
Two additional remarks are useful. First, it need not be the case that being a Demo-
cratic appointee causes the judge to decide diﬀerently. Perhaps being a Democratic ap-
pointee is simply correlated with other omitted characteristics of the judge that determine
decision-making. Even if we are sure that being a Democratic appointee causes diﬀerential
decision-making, we need to know why that is the case, whether it is due to formative life
experiences or subsequent professional experiences. Perhaps Democratic appointees make
diﬀerent decisions because litigants tailor their oral arguments to the judge. In the frame-
work of the Rubin causal model, random assignment of Democratic appointees who make
diﬀerent decisions than Republican appointees, for whatever reasons, is suﬃcient to estimate
ac a u s a lr e l a t i o n s h i po fl a wo no u t c o m e s .
5.3 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The OLS model in equation (2.1) can remain biased because it fails to address reverse
causality and omitted variable bias. While the law can drive political backlash, popular
policy preferences can also lead to changes in state legislation or more litigation to invalidate
existing policies. Moreover, abortion decisions may be correlated with appellate precedents
in other legal areas such as the death penalty. If other legal areas also inﬂuence policy
preferences, then our estimates may be biased upward, since they fail to account for the
omitted eﬀects of the other laws. As a solution, we employ an instrumental variables strategy
whose random variation arises where the percentages of abortion laws that are pro-choice
vary randomly across each circuit and year. We exploit the facts that (1) judges are randomly
assigned to three-judge panels for each case and (2) Democratic appointees are more likely
to vote liberally in abortion cases.
615.3.1 Correlation Between Judicial Biography and Voting
For the ﬁrst stage in our two-stage least squares estimation, we use the fact that judges’
personal attributes can be correlated with their voting behavior in appellate cases, which
translates to panel vote outcomes, and therefore, changes in circuit-level abortion law.74
Prior research has documented that since the 1970s, federal appellate judges appointed by
a Democratic president are more likely to vote pro-choice in an abortion rights case, while
Republican appointees favor pro-life decisions.75 We replicate this ﬁnding in our data and
present these ﬁrst-stage results in Table 2.1. Abortion can be a prominent issue in elections
and in party identiﬁcation. A common explanation for why Democratic appointees vote
pro-choice is that ideology drives judicial voting, with political party predicting the judge’s
ideology. Note that the mechanism does not aﬀect the validity of our empirical strategy.
5.3.2 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
Figure 2.4 roughly depicts the intuition for our 2SLS identiﬁcation strategy, in which we
exploit the random variation that arises from using the actual deviations from the expected
probability of a circuit-year having judges who were Democratic appointees. The ﬂatter
line is the expected number of Democratic appointees on a panel. The jagged line is the
actual number of Democratic appointees on a panel. (The ﬁgure displays the average values
across all circuits.) Circuit-years receiving an unexpectedly high proportion of Democratic
appointees on their panels receive an unexpectedly higher proportion of pro-choice abortion
decisions. Each actual spike above the expected probability of getting a Democratic judge
corresponds to the circuit-year randomly receiving a “treatment” of more pro-choice abortion
decisions. Thus, changes in people’s policy preferences can be attributed to the “treatment”
of pro-choice appellate laws. Figure 2.4 suggests the ﬁrst stage equation:
74Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010); Chang and Schoar (2008); Ellman, Sunstein, Schkade (2004).
75Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, and Sawicki (2006).
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64Lawct =  0+ 1Treatmentct+ 21[Mct > 0]+ 3Cc+ 4Tt+ 5Cc⇤Y ear+ 6Wct+ 7Xict+⌘ict
(2.2)
where Lawct is deﬁned as the percentage of abortion decisions that are liberal, conditional
on there being any abortion decisions in that circuit and year. The “Treatment” group
(Treatmentct = 1) comprises people in a circuit who experience an unexpectedly higher per-
centage of pro-choice abortion decisions due to an unexpectedly higher number of Democratic
appointees being assigned to the panels. The “Control” group (Treatmentct =0 )c o m p r i s e s
people in a circuit who experience an unexpectedly lower percentage of abortion decisions
that are pro-choice. Formally, Treatmentct = 1 [(Nct/Mct > E(Nct/Mct)], where N is the
expected number of Democrats assigned to all abortion cases in that circuit-year and M is
the number of abortion cases in that circuit year. N/M is the expected number of Demo-
cratic appointees in any given case. The eﬀect of abortion law on policy preferences is the
diﬀerence in Yict for Treatmentct =1o r0 ,d i v i d e db yt h ed i ﬀerence in Lawct for Treatmentct
=1o r0 .
For more statistical power in our main IV speciﬁcations, we employ the entire excess
proportion of cases with a Democratic appointee as a continuous instrumental variable. That
is, we estimate in our ﬁrst stage:
Lawct =  0 + 1Zct + 21[Mct > 0]+ 3Cc + 4Tt + 5Cc ⇤Y ear+ 6Wct + 7Xict +⌘ict (2.3)
where our instrument Zct is the diﬀerence between the actual proportion of cases with Demo-
cratic appointees and the expected proportion of cases with a Democratic appointee. We
redeﬁne Treatmentct =N ct/Mct - E(Nct/Mct). The moment condition for causal inference is
E[(Nct/Mct - E(Nct/Mct)) "ict]=0 .
This framework in (3) may be the cleanest in terms of identiﬁcation, where the i.i.d.
65condition E(Zct"ict)=0m u s tb es a t i s ﬁ e d .H o w e v e r ,i ti se n t i r e l yp o s s i b l et h a tp e o p l em a y
be more responsive to the number of pro-choice decisions rather than the percentage of
cases. We show estimates from a version of (3) that uses the number of pro-choice decisions
instead of percentage of pro-choice decisions as well as the OLS model of (1) in our results.
Multiplying the moment condition for (3) by Mct results in E[(Nct - E(Nct)) ✏ict]=0 . We now
deﬁne Treatmentct =N ct - E(Nct)a n di ne q u a t i o n s( 2 . 1 )a n d( 2 . 2 ) ,l e tLawct be the number
of pro-choice abortion cases. As a check for possible omitted variables76 in excluding Mct,
we use Lawct as measured with the number of liberal (pro-choice) decisions and, as a check,
the number of conservative (pro-life) decisions.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 First Stage Estimates
Table 2.1 documents the relationship between pro-choice abortion appellate decisions and the
random assignment of Democratic appointees using our dataset of cases from 1971 to 2004.
Columns 1 and 2 show the relationship at the judge level, where we regress an individual
judge’s vote on an indicator for Democratic appointment, clustering the standard errors by
circuit; Column 2 controls for circuit and year ﬁxed eﬀects and the expected probability of
ac a s eb e i n ga s s i g n e daD e m o c r a t i ca p p o i n t e ei ne a c hc i r c u i t - y e a r .AD e m o c r a t i ca p p o i n t e e
is 17.2% more likely to vote pro-choice than a Republican appointee (Column 2). Further,
our unreported tabulations show that appellate panels assigned two or more Democratic
appointees vote pro-choice 71% of the time, compared with 51% for panels with two or more
Republican appointees. These correlations are consistent with those reported in existing
literature, such as Sunstein et al. (2006). Columns 3 and 4 show the relationship at the case
level, with and without regression controls. Randomly assigning a panel to have a majority
76The omitted variables that are associated with Mct,p r o - c h o i c ed e c i s i o n s ,a n do u t c o m eY ict may also be
associated with the number of pro-life decisions.
66of Democratic appointees is predictive of a pro-choice decision, though the estimate is noisier
when including circuit, year, and judicial pool controls. The relationship at the circuit-year
level is shown in the next columns. Columns 7 and 8 show the relationship after merging with
individual-level data from the GSS. Circuit-years with unexpectedly higher proportions of
judges assigned to abortion cases who are Democrats predict a higher proportions of abortion
decisions that are pro-choice. The F-statistic of joint signiﬁcance for the instrument deﬁned
as the deviation between the actual and expected percentage of judges being Democratic
appointees is 11.86 in the merged sample (Column 8).
6.2 Main Results
Table 2.2 shows preliminary results for abortion attitudes. Ordinary least squares estimates
of the eﬀect of abortion law, measured as the proportion of judicial abortion decisions that
are liberal (pro-choice), show small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the general pop-
ulation’s views about when abortions should be legal (Column 1). The ﬁrst row displays
as u m m a r yo ft h ea b o r t i o na t t i t u d e s ,t h ea v e r a g eo ft h en u m b e ro fn o n - m i s s i n gs u r v e yr e -
sponses per individual. Columns 2-4 show estimates exploiting the random assignment of
Democratic judges for exogenous variation in appellate abortion decisions. These IV es-
timates suggest that appellate abortion decisions have a causal impact on people’s views
on abortion legality. The summary index, being the average of all abortion responses per
individual, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. It suggests an overall
conservative (pro-life) response to more pro-choice decisions. In particular, an unexpectedly
higher percentage of pro-choice decisions causes people to be more likely to express pro-life
attitudes, believing that abortion should be illegal for women who choose abortion for family
size reasons or because they want to remain single; these estimates are statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level. Column 3 shows that the causal eﬀect of the number of pro-choice
decision also increases the likelihood of conservative responses to prohibit abortion if the
woman seeks it for reasons of family size, her own endangered health, family income, or pre-
67ferring to remain single. For example, an additional, exogenous pro-choice decision makes
people 8.9% more likely to oppose allowing abortions for married women who do not want
any more children. With a population mean of 44% and standard deviation 50% for this
survey question (Table B), one abortion decision can lead to an economically sizable shift in
abortion attitudes. Finally, we verify that the eﬀect of an extra exogenous pro-life decision
is opposite in sign from the eﬀect of an extra exogenous pro-choice decision (Column 4).
Table 2.3 presents the eﬀect of abortion decisions on individuals’ political self-identiﬁcation,
on a spectrum ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Following an increase
in exogenous percentage of pro-choice appellate decisions, people are 5.3% more likely to
identify as strong Republicans (Columns 2) and a similar magnitude are less likely to iden-
tify as an Independent, near Democrat. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that abortion laws may shift preferences among some individuals so that they change their
political association. It is also possible that political parties may adjust their agendas based
on abortion issues to attract supporters. In other words, these results can be construed as
“backlash” among the population, or alternatively, as evidence that judicial abortion policy
aﬀects the strategies of political parties.
Next, we explore whether the main results can be explained by spurious correlations
between pre-existing public opinion and abortion decisions (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Figure 2.5
shows the event study graph of the coeﬃcient on law for the abortion index and the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the questionnaire, along with 90% conﬁdence interval bounds. Across all
speciﬁcations, there is an increase at date 0 of pro-life attitudes, in relation to an increase in
pro-choice decisions. Subsequently, the attitude turns from backlash to expressive, and after
year 4, law appears to have no eﬀect. This is also borne out in the tables.
The OLS speciﬁcations show that current year appellate abortion decisions are not
correlated with public opinions on abortion from two years ago (Table 2.4, Column 1).
Similarly, current abortion decisions are not correlated with the political association from
two years ago (Table 2.5, Column 1). We choose a two year-window because the ﬁling of
68(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Abortion Attitude Summary Index 0.0154  0.1040+ 0.0593+ -0.1010+  9585
(0.0154) (0.0585) (0.0310) (0.0609)
It should NOT be possible for a 
woman to obtain a legal abortion if:
0.0151  0.0394  0.0335  -0.0574  9292
(0.0146) (0.0517) (0.0241) (0.0541)
0.0248  0.1675* 0.0885* -0.1517+ 9262
(0.0247) (0.0767) (0.0447) (0.0830)
0.0096  0.0711+ 0.0419* -0.0720+ 9323
(0.0104) (0.0384) (0.0195) (0.0413)
0.0156  0.1105+ 0.0686* -0.1173+ 9225
(0.0163) (0.0648) (0.0325) (0.0685)
0.0187+ 0.0414  0.0217  -0.0373  9256
(0.0101) (0.0387) (0.0218) (0.0359)
0.0281  0.1780* 0.0964* -0.1650+ 9257
(0.0253) (0.0856) (0.0453) (0.0906)
-0.0020  0.2300  0.0797  -0.2138  7939
(0.0245) (0.1707) (0.0567) (0.1891)
Table 2.2. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law on Abortion Attitudes
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
circuit level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual 
and Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the 
difference between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant 
at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
There is strong chance of serious 
defect in the baby
She is married and she does not 
want any more children
The woman’s own health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy
The family has a very low income 
and cannot afford any more children
She became pregnant as a result of 
rape
She is not married and does not 
want to marry the man
The woman wants the abortion for 
any reason
69(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as a Republican, 
Democrat, Independent, or what?
-0.00590 0.00271 -0.00197 0.00312 14552
(0.00813) (0.0141) (0.00825) (0.0128)
-0.00500 -0.00106 0.00557 -0.00881 14552
(0.00579) (0.0279) (0.0145) (0.0231)
-0.00795 -0.0533* -0.0354* 0.0560+ 14552
(0.00703) (0.0221) (0.0129) (0.0291)
0.00405 -0.0533+ -0.0264 0.0417+ 14552
(0.00964) (0.0249) (0.0149) (0.0211)
-0.00170 -0.0171 -0.0165 0.0262 14552
(0.00660) (0.0185) (0.0127) (0.0181)
-0.00271 0.0628 0.0427+ -0.0675+ 14552
(0.0105) (0.0361) (0.0227) (0.0360)
0.0195** 0.0535* 0.0288* -0.0456+ 14552
(0.00331) (0.0192) (0.0116) (0.0212)
Not a Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
circuit level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual 
and Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the 
difference between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant 
at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.3. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law on Political Association
Strong Democrat
Not a Strong Democrat
Independent, Near Democrat
Independent
Independent, Near Republican
70-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
I
n
d
e
x
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
D
e
f
e
c
t
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
N
o
_
M
o
r
e
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
P
o
o
r
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
R
a
p
e
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
S
i
n
g
l
e
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
(
Y
e
a
r
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
A
n
y
_
R
e
a
s
o
n
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
E
v
e
n
t
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
 
D
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
F
i
g
u
r
e
2
.
5
:
E
v
e
n
t
S
t
u
d
y
o
f
P
r
o
-
C
h
o
i
c
e
D
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
71(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Abortion Attitude Summary Index 0.0182 0.0268 0.0136 -0.0247 10362
(0.0105) (0.0260) (0.0193) (0.0286)
It should NOT be possible for a woman 
to obtain a legal abortion if:
0.0123 0.0378+ 0.0215 -0.0392 10036
(0.0120) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0239)
0.0228 0.0267 0.0137 -0.0250 10016
(0.0212) (0.0376) (0.0246) (0.0388)
-0.00519 0.0373* 0.0208 -0.0380* 10097
(0.0106) (0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0185)
0.0117 0.0212 0.0109 -0.0198 9993
(0.0129) (0.0403) (0.0295) (0.0483)
0.00971 0.0409+ 0.0222 -0.0408 10001
(0.0138) (0.0247) (0.0157) (0.0261)
0.0312+ -0.0148 -0.0116 0.0211 9997
(0.0159) (0.0395) (0.0221) (0.0453)
0.0351+ 0.0223 0.0109 -0.0204 9273
(0.0169) (0.0400) (0.0259) (0.0427)
She is not married and does not want 
to marry the man
The woman wants the abortion for 
any reason
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the circuit 
level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual and 
Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the difference 
between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant at 10%; * 
Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.4. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law Two Years Subsequent to 
This Year's Abortion Attitudes
There is strong chance of serious 
defect in the baby
She is married and she does not want 
any more children
The woman’s own health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy
The family has a very low income and 
cannot afford any more children
She became pregnant as a result of 
rape
72(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Generally speaking, do you usually think 
of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, 
Independent, or what?
0.00910 -0.0475 -0.0180 0.0359 14940
(0.00871) (0.0301) (0.0161) (0.0306)
-0.00564 -0.00244 -0.00130 0.00235 14940
(0.0109) (0.0323) (0.0157) (0.0314)
0.00389 -0.00478 0.00430 -0.00863 14940
(0.00722) (0.0254) (0.0132) (0.0271)
0.0134 0.0637** 0.0275+ -0.0550** 14940
(0.00961) (0.0163) (0.0150) (0.0175)
-0.0175* -0.0345 -0.0102 0.0207 14940
(0.00692) (0.0241) (0.0153) (0.0257)
0.00112 -0.00314 -0.0125 0.0251 14940
(0.00804) (0.0285) (0.0161) (0.0344)
-0.0000414 0.0371 0.0160 -0.0317 14940
(0.00986) (0.0258) (0.0137) (0.0255)
Not a Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the circuit 
level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual and 
Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the difference 
between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant at 10%; * 
Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.5. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law Two Years Subsequent to 
This Year's Political Association
Strong Democrat
Not a Strong Democrat
Independent, Near Democrat
Independent
Independent, Near Republican
73abortion cases at the appellate courts can be salient and appellate decisions can take up to
ay e a rt or e s o l v e ,e v e na f t e rt h ej u d g e sa r er e v e a l e dt ot h ep a r t i e s .I na d d i t i o n ,f e wo ft h e
IV estimates show positive, though not signiﬁcant relationships between current abortion
decisions and the previous year’s abortion attitudes or political association. This can also
be seen in the event graph, and could be due to the timing of the law. By restricting to
a two-year window, the results aﬃrm there is no spurious “causal” eﬀect. Tables 2.6 and
2.7 show a similar exercise with estimates of the relationship between current appellate
abortion decisions and public opinion from four years before.77 The IV estimates are not
statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations (Columns 2 through 4), and the handful that
appear statistically signiﬁcant are to be expected from running a hundred regressions testing
for spurious correlations.
Do abortion attitudes respond to appellate decisions that simultaneously occur in
other legal areas? Our policy experiment based on the random assignment of judges can also
create exogenous changes in legal areas other than abortion. In Table 2.8, we implement
falsiﬁcation exercises where we explore the eﬀects of appellate decisions from the legal areas of
First Amendment commercial speech. This area is also politically controversial, like abortion
rights law, but it is not directly linked with abortion ideology. Judges’ political biographies
correlate strongly with their voting behaviors on these issues, so we also instrument for the
law using the unexpected deviation between the number of Democratic judges on the panel
and the expected number of Democratic judges on the panel in that legal category. We
ﬁnd that First Amendment commercial speech decisions do not aﬀect abortion attitudes.
This result suggests that the relationship between appellate abortion decisions and abortion
attitudes is real.78
77The three-year forward estimates show some statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. However, these coeﬃ-
cients are not robust to the exclusion of circuit-speciﬁc time trends, while the main results and other placebo
tests are.
78We acknowledge that other highly politically sensitive areas of law, especially those that directly relate
to women’s rights (such as aﬃrmative action) or those that play a prominent role in partisan platforms may
also inﬂuence abortion attitudes and/or party identiﬁcation.
74(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Abortion Attitude Summary Index -0.00153 0.0648 0.0632 -0.0662 11844
(0.0105) (0.0499) (0.0654) (0.0660)
It should NOT be possible for a 
woman to obtain a legal abortion if:
-0.0151+ 0.0549 0.0612 -0.0645 11487
(0.00797) (0.0581) (0.0712) (0.0778)
0.000829 0.0486 0.0425 -0.0444 11425
(0.0171) (0.0709) (0.0868) (0.0868)
-0.00403 -0.0321 -0.0363 0.0379 11526
(0.00412) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0359)
0.0104 0.119* 0.119 -0.124 11447
(0.0161) (0.0543) (0.0795) (0.0791)
-0.00638 0.0317 0.0325 -0.0340 11414
(0.00640) (0.0398) (0.0518) (0.0507)
-0.00142 0.0983 0.0949 -0.0993 15171
(0.0170) (0.0768) (0.0939) (0.0981)
0.0125 0.0943 0.0751 -0.0842 10140
(0.0203) (0.101) (0.105) (0.121)
She is not married and does not 
want to marry the man
The woman wants the abortion for 
any reason
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the circuit 
level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual and 
Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the difference 
between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant at 10%; * 
Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.6. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law Four Years Subsequent to 
This Year's Abortion Attitudes
There is strong chance of serious 
defect in the baby
She is married and she does not 
want any more children
The woman’s own health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy
The family has a very low income 
and cannot afford any more children
She became pregnant as a result of 
rape
75(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Model OLS IV IV IV
Abortion Law Measure
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Percentage 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Choice
Number of 
Pro-Life
Outcome Variables
Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as a Republican, 
Democrat, Independent, or what?
0.00459 0.00203 0.0113 -0.0116 15171
(0.0119) (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0358)
-0.00772 0.0214 0.0247 -0.0254 15171
(0.00731) (0.0232) (0.0255) (0.0263)
-0.0120 -0.0240 -0.0346+ 0.0356 15171
(0.00770) (0.0202) (0.0208) (0.0224)
-0.00871 -0.0460* -0.0395+ 0.0407+ 15171
(0.00802) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0233)
-0.0000725 0.0438+ 0.0448 -0.0461+ 15171
(0.00779) (0.0230) (0.0277) (0.0270)
0.0205* 0.0185 0.0147 -0.0151 15171
(0.00777) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0187)
-0.000420 0.000602 -0.00332 0.00342 15171
(0.00696) (0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0198)
Not a Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the circuit 
level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual and Expected 
number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the difference between the 
Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 
5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.7. The Effect of Appellate Abortion Law Four Years Subsequent to 
This Year's Political Association
Strong Democrat
Not a Strong Democrat
Independent, Near Democrat
Independent
Independent, Near Republican
76Model IV IV IV N
First Amendment Law Measure
Percentage 
Liberal
Number of 
Liberal
Number of 
Conservative
Abortion Attitude Summary Index 0.0164 0.0124 -0.0212
(0.0342) (0.0200) (0.0705) 7450
It should NOT be possible for a woman 
to obtain a legal abortion if:
0.0162 0.0124 -0.0325 7243
(0.0352) (0.0193) (0.0707)
0.00483 0.00274 0.00579 7200
(0.0450) (0.0283) (0.0805)
-0.00312 0.000422 0.0161 7256
(0.0270) (0.0175) (0.0525)
0.0260 0.0265 -0.0437 7188
(0.0376) (0.0233) (0.0975)
0.0364 0.0256 -0.0701 7205
(0.0546) (0.0272) (0.118)
0.0352 0.0204 -0.0419 7190
(0.0385) (0.0228) (0.0807)
-0.0192 -0.0179 0.0657 7178
(0.0416) (0.0300) (0.0815)
The woman wants the abortion for 
any reason
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The abortion index is an average of the 
non-missing values of the seven abortion attitudes reported in Table 2-4. Standard errors are clustered at the 
circuit level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, state fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the difference between the Actual 
and Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 4 use as an instrument the the 
difference between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant 
at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2.8. The Effect Other Laws on This Year's Abortion Attitudes
(holding a government regulation 
banning commercial free speech as 
constitutional)
There is strong chance of serious 
defect in the baby
She is married and she does not want 
any more children
The woman’s own health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy
The family has a very low income 
and cannot afford any more children
She became pregnant as a result of 
rape
She is not married and does not want 
to marry the man
77How long does backlash to abortion policy persist over time? In Table 2.9, we explore
the longer run eﬀects of appellate abortion decisions. We ﬁnd evidence that two years after an
exogenous increase in pro-choice abortion decisions, people are more likely to voice pro-choice
attitudes overall. Four years after an exogenous increase in pro-choice abortion decisions,
people are more likely to identify as an Independent, near Democrat. The eﬀect can also be
seen in the event study graph in Figure 2.5. Thus, the results may suggest that backlash
eﬀects dissipate quickly after a policy decision.
7P r i m i n g E x p e r i m e n t
This study recruits workers through a labor market intermediary (LMI), namely, Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The LMI is designed to recruit a large number of workers in a short amount
of time. Through an interface provided by the LMI, registered users perform tasks posted
by buyers for money. The tasks are generally simple for humans, yet diﬃcult for computers
to perform. Common tasks include captioning photographs, extracting data from scanned
documents, and transcribing audio clips. The LMI also allows a researcher to implement
randomization, although randomization is not inherent to the LMI. Although most buyers
post tasks directly on the LMI website, they are also able to host tasks on an external
site. We use this external hosting method: we post a single placeholder task containing a
description of the work at the LMI and a link for workers to follow if they want to participate.
The subjects are then randomized, via stratiﬁcation in the order in which they arrived at
the job, to one of several treatment conditions. Treatment is not revealed at this early state.
All workers see identical instructions.
We ask workers to transcribe paragraphs from a Tagalog translation of Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of Nations as well as English paragraphs of dictionary deﬁnitions. This task is
suﬃciently tedious that no one is likely to do it “for fun,” and it is suﬃciently simple that
78Model IV IV IV N
Outcomes 2 years later
Percentage Pro-
Choice
Number Pro-
Choice
Number Pro-
Life
Abortion Index -0.0637* -0.0414** 0.0873* 9939
(0.0295) (0.0150) (0.0444)
-0.0237 -0.0185 0.0359 14929
(0.0319) (0.0198) (0.0397)
0.0157 0.0116 -0.0226 14929
(0.0221) (0.0176) (0.0285)
-0.0241 -0.0229 0.0446 14929
(0.0288) (0.0242) (0.0414)
0.0515 0.0343 -0.0668 14929
(0.0369) (0.0243) (0.0450)
0.000403 0.000120 -0.000235 14929
(0.0247) (0.0157) (0.0305)
0.0274 0.0267 -0.0520 14929
(0.0407) (0.0240) (0.0541)
-0.0412+ -0.0287+ 0.0559+ 14929
(0.0212) (0.0166) (0.0296)
Outcomes 4 years later
Percentage Pro-
Choice
Number Pro-
Choice
Number Pro-
Life
Abortion Index -0.00583 0.00175 -0.00411 8324
(0.0475) (0.0259) (0.0615)
0.0281 0.0145 -0.0304 11990
(0.0291) (0.0175) (0.0370)
-0.00168 0.00305 -0.00637 11990
(0.0271) (0.0164) (0.0358)
0.0531* 0.0250** -0.0523+ 11990
(0.0253) (0.00932) (0.0277)
-0.0283 -0.0275** 0.0574+ 11990
(0.0283) (0.00957) (0.0344)
-0.0385 -0.0176 0.0368 11990
(0.0249) (0.0110) (0.0302)
0.000620 0.0130 -0.0273 11990
(0.0290) (0.0122) (0.0345)
-0.0109 -0.00711 0.0149 11990
(0.0182) (0.00873) (0.0225)
Independent, Near Democrat
Table 2.9. The Effect of Abortion Laws on Future Years' Abortion 
Attitudes and Political Association
Strong Democrat
Not a Strong Democrat
Independent, Near Democrat
Independent
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The abortion index is an average 
of the non-missing values of the seven abortion attitudes reported in Tables 2-4. Standard errors are 
clustered at the circuit level. Regressions control for age and gender and include circuit fixed effects, 
state fixed effects, year fixed effects, circuit-specific time trends. Column 2 uses as an instrument the 
difference between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats assigned per seat. Columns 3 and 
4 use as an instrument the the difference between the Actual and Expected number of Democrats 
assigned per abortion panel.  + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Independent
Independent, Near 
Republican
Not a Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Independent, Near 
Republican
Not a Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Strong Democrat
Not a Strong Democrat
79Model IV N
Outcome Variables
Abortion Attitude Summary Index 0.0262 345
(0.0203)
It should NOT be possible for a woman to 
obtain a legal abortion if:
-0.00464 345
(0.0252)
0.0305 345
(0.0324)
-0.0135 345
(0.0174)
0.0576* 345
(0.0327)
0.0129 345
(0.0220)
0.0323 345
(0.0329)
0.0686** 345
(0.0326)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Gender, age, log error rates of the data 
transcription are controls.  + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant 
at 1%.
Table 2.10: The Effect of Exposure to Liberal Abortion 
Decisions on Abortion Attitudes
There is strong chance of serious defect in 
the baby
She is married and she does not want any 
more children
The woman’s own health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy
The family has a very low income and 
cannot afford any more children
She became pregnant as a result of rape
She is not married and does not want to 
marry the man
The woman wants the abortion for any 
reason
80all market participants can do the task.79 Because subjects are unaware of an on-going ex-
periment, diﬀerential attrition may arise at the time treatment is revealed (Reips 2001). We
minimize attrition through a commitment mechanism. In all treatment conditions, workers
face an identical “lock-in” task in order to minimize diﬀerential attrition before the treatment
is revealed. The following are the treatments in our experiment:
1o f3L o c k - i nT a s k s : Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga
antas ng parehong damdamin, sa proporsyon ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro.Ang labis
na kung saan sila magbuntis sa kahirapan ng mga wretches nakakaapekto sa partikular na
bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ng higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil sa takot na arises mula
sa kathang isip nila kung ano ang kani-kanilang mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang
ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap sa, at kung sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga
sarili ay talagang apektado sa parehong miserable paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa ng mga
kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa kanilang mga masasaktin frame, upang gumawa ng na galis
oh i n d im a p a l a g a yd a m d a mc o m p l a i n e dn g .
Treatment 1 (Conservative Abortion Decision): The Casey ruling upheld the
right of states to regulate abortions. The legislators had passed a law that restricted abortion
by, among other things, requiring a mandatory waiting period, state-written counseling,
parental consent and husband notiﬁcation. The Court of Appeals upheld every restriction
except one. Abortion, they said, was no longer a fundamental constitutional right, but rather
a “limited fundamental right.” This “right,” in other words, could be limited by any law a
legislature passed and a court thought was “reasonable.”
Treatment 2 (Conservative Abortion Decision): The court upheld a law, con-
sidered the most restrictive in the nation, that required women to consult with a doctor
79Time and money are the most cited reasons for participation in Mechanical Turk (http://behind-the-
enemy-lines.blogspot.com/2008/03/mechanical-turk-demographics.html). Some workers do it out of need. A
disabled former United States Army linguist became a Turk Worker for various reasons and in nine months
he made four thousand dollars (New York Times, March 25, 2007). Some drop out of college to pursue a full
time career with these disaggregated labor markets (Web Worker Daily, October 16, 2008, Interview with
oDesk CEO). For more information about the motivation and demographics of Mechanical Turk workers,
see, e.g. Paolacci et al. (2010).
81face-to-face at least 24 hours before getting an abortion, except in certain cases of rape and
incest. The law required doctors to provide speciﬁc information about the procedure, risks,
alternatives and social service programs, and hand out a booklet containing pictures of de-
veloping fetuses. Furthermore, the material doctors distribute will be developed by the state
Department of Health and Social Services.
Treatment 3 (Liberal Abortion Decision): The court reviewed a Massachusetts
law requiring parental consent before abortions can be performed on minor girls. The court
struck down a part of the law that required any woman seeking an abortion to wait 24 hours
after signing an informed consent form before having the abortion procedure. The court also
struck down the part of the law that required the consent form to contain a description of
the fetus.
Treatment 4 (Liberal Abortion Decision): Seven Missouri laws regulating abor-
tion were challenged in a class action lawsuit. The court declared all seven statutes unconsti-
tutional, including a requirement that physicians perform certain medical tests when there
was reason to believe a fetus had reached at least 20 weeks of gestational age. These tests,
which included assessments of fetal weight and lung maturity, were designed to determine
the viability of an unborn child. The statute’s indicated that “[t]he life of each human being
begins at conception” was also struck down.
Treatment 5 (Control): The focus of art music was characterized by exploration of
new rhythms, styles, and sounds. Jazz evolved and became a signiﬁcant genre of music over
the course of the 20th century, and during the second half of that century, rock music did
the same. Jazz is an American musical art form that originated in the beginning of the 20th
century in African American communities in the Southern United States from a conﬂuence
of African and European music traditions. The style’s West African pedigree is evident in
its use of blue notes, improvisation, polyrhythms, syncopation, and the swung note. From
its early development until the present, jazz has also incorporated music from 19th and 20th
century American popular music. Jazz has, from its early 20th century inception, spawned
82av a r i e t yo fs u b g e n r e s .
Since all workers will face at most one abortion-related decision, for the speciﬁcation,
we do not need to control for the presence of the case, but instead treat the pro-choice decision
as 1,0, 1 when they face Liberal Abortion Decision, Control Group, and Conservative
Abortion Decision, respectively. Out of a sample of 345 data entry workers, when exposed
to Liberal Abortion Decisions (or not exposed to conservative decisions), workers become
more conservative on two dimensions of abortion attitudes: whether it should NOT be
possible to have a legal abortion if the family has very low income (liberal decisions increase
this percentage by 6% points) and cannot aﬀord any more children, and whether the woman
wants abortion for any reason (liberal decisions increase this percentage by 7% points).
These eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively, and are
similar in magnitude to the estimates in the population sample. Table 2.10 displays the
eﬀects controlling for gender, age, and log error rates. The eﬀects are robust to the exclusion
of these controls or the inclusion of additional controls, such as dummy indicators for India
and the US.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Despite a large literature on backlash, there has been little formal theoretical or causal
empirical work on the economics of backlash. In this paper, we take a ﬁrst step at assessing
the signiﬁcance of the question of whether policy decisions aﬀect policy preferences. We
present a theoretical framework for understanding why laws can have expressive eﬀects or
backlash eﬀects. Using a uniquely assembled dataset and an identiﬁcation strategy that
exploits the random variation connected to appellate decision-making, our study estimates
the eﬀect of abortion decisions on political preferences. Democratic appointee judges favor
pro-choice abortion decisions. The random assignment of these judges increases the likelihood
of pro-choice outcomes. Public opinion subsequently becomes less favorable toward abortion
83legality, and conservative political party identiﬁcation becomes more pronounced. This eﬀect
is reversed over time, as laws are characterized by expressive eﬀects.
84Chapter 3
Physician Publications and
Pharmaceutical Company Payments
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Pharmaceutical company payments to physicians have always been a topic of considerable
discussion. Recent debate has focused on full disclosure and transparency, and there are
considerable eﬀorts to reveal all the payments pharmaceutical companies make to doctors,
large or small. The rationale for full disclosure and transparency is that even small payments
may bias a doctor’s decision-making process, prescribing patterns, and, ultimately, aﬀect
health outcomes.
The American Medical Association (1998) and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (2009) both recommend a maximum gift of $100 to physicians.8081
As these guidelines are not strictly enforced, several states have enacted laws requiring full
disclosure of all payments from pharmaceutical companies to physicians. There has also
been action taken at the national level. The Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act
(2010) makes annual disclosure mandatory for all pharmaceutical payments greater than $10
80http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion8061.page
81http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/ﬁles/pdf/phrma_marketing_code_2008-1.pdfstarting in 2014.
This paper analyzes payment information from the production side, by looking at the
factors determining the payment amounts pharmaceutical companies give to physicians and
the eﬀect of disclosure on payment levels. The pharmaceutical companies pay physicians to
promote company products, and the eﬀectiveness of such promotions depends on physicians’
inﬂuence. I analyze payments from 12 pharmaceutical companies, comprising roughly 42% of
all payments to physicians, to construct a list of all physicians who have been paid between
2009-2011. Using the Web of Science database, I divided the set of all paid physicians into
those who have published in medical journals, and those who have not. Using publication
history as a proxy for inﬂuence (or type), I ﬁnd that prior research is a strong predictor of
future payments, and is robust to alternative measures of research quantity. Most physicians
in my sample, almost 80%, are paid by one pharmaceutical company and for one type of
payment. The probability of being paid by more than one company almost doubles for
published doctors. They are also paid larger amounts.
I take advantage of several states having sunshine laws during the payment years to
analyze the causal eﬀect of publications on payments. The disclosure of payments in my
dataset is mostly made possible as a result of legal settlements with pharmaceutical com-
panies and the US Department of Justice. For several states, however, disclosure laws were
already in place during my payment sample period, and the pharmaceutical companies were
required to publish all payments to the physicians residing in those states. The magnitude of
the payment could be aﬀected by whether or not such payments become public information,
and the eﬀect might vary based on the inﬂuence of physicians. The reputation eﬀect suggests
that payments as a function of publication should increase in states with existing disclosure
laws. Prior research has shown that disclosure laws can lower the average amount of pay-
ments, but larger payments may actually increase.82 I ﬁnd similar results when looking at the
eﬀect of disclosure laws on the magnitude of publication on payments. Published physicians
82Chen et al. (2013).
86command higher payments in states with existing disclosure laws. This conforms with the
reputation story of higher payments serving as compensation for making such information
public.
Among published physicians, I also look at which physicians the pharmaceutical com-
panies target within research ﬁelds. I ﬁnd that pharmaceutical company payments are spread
over networks of researchers rather than individual specialists in a ﬁeld. I look at alternative
measures of networks, such as coauthorship and citation links. For both speciﬁcations, one
paid physician in a network increases the likelihood that others will also be paid by the
same pharmaceutical company and for the same category. Since physicians working on the
same research and being paid by the same company are more likely to be aware of others’
payments (although perhaps, not the magnitude of the payments), this transparency eﬀect
is consistent with higher disclosure leading to higher payment result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature review.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the main data sources and presents pre-
liminary ﬁndings. Section 5 presents the main results of the paper and conducts robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w
Pharmaceutical companies’ promotional spending has been steadily growing in the past sev-
eral decades. By some estimates, it has reached $57.5 billion with most of it going directly as
payments to physicians. To curtail excessive courting of doctors, both the American Medical
Association (1998) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (2009)
have suggested a limit of $100 for gifts from pharmaceutical companies to physicians.8384
Some authors, such as Katz et al. (2010), have gone as far as advocating complete elimina-
83http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion8061.page
84http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/ﬁles/108/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf
87tion of any type of gifts from pharmaceutical companies to physicians. They argue that even
small gifts can generate adverse eﬀects and bias the incentives of physicians.
To address this eﬀect, three states have passed strong disclosure laws, or “sunshine
laws,” where pharmaceutical companies are required to report payments made to doctors.
Minnesota was the ﬁrst state to pass such a law in January of 1997; it stipulated that
payments from pharmaceutical companies to healthcare providers to be reported and be
made available to the general public. Vermont and Massachusetts followed suit in June, 2002
and July, 2009, respectively. California, the District of Columbia, Maine, and West Virginia
also now mandate reporting of payments by drug companies to healthcare providers, though
such reports are not usually available to the public and are thus considered to be weaker
disclosure laws. In addition, there is a pending bill in Ohio, and on a national scale, a
federal bill that would require public disclosure of all payments from drug manufacturers to
physicians (Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act (2010), Chen et al. (2013)).
The literature on the inﬂuence of payments on physicians and the eﬀect of disclosure
laws is mixed. Loewenstein et al. (2011) argue that disclosures in general may not be an
eﬀective remedy for conﬂicts of interest and could have unintended consequences. Most
of the prior literature on pharmaceutical company payments to physicians takes advantage
of the diﬀerences in laws between states. Ross et al. (2007) look at the early disclosure
laws and reports from Vermont and Minnesota, and ﬁnd mixed results in their eﬀectiveness.
They partly attribute the quality of earlier years’ data on their results. Wazana (2000) uses
self-reported disclosures to look at the eﬀect of payments on physician behavior. Haayer
(1982) and Orlowski and Wateska (1992) ﬁnd some evidence of gifts to physicians aﬀecting
subsequent prescribing behavior. Pham-Kanter et al. (2012) ﬁnd limited evidence of the
eﬀect of payments in West Virginia and Maine. On the other hand, Cain et al. (2005) and
Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2010) argue that disclosure laws may have the opposite eﬀect.
Chen et al. (2013) look at the eﬀect of disclosure laws on payments to physicians. They ﬁnd
strong disclosure laws reduce the overall amount of payments, but increase larger payments
88of $100 or more.
Ia b s t r a c ta w a yf r o mt h ep o s s i b l ec h a n g ei ni n c e n t i v e sa n db e h a v i o ro fp h y s i c i a n s
after payments and instead focus on pharmaceutical companies’ optimization of payment
structures. Using prior publication count as proxy for physician type, I look at the eﬀect of
publications and disclosure on payments. Prior research has generally omitted the pharma-
ceutical company’s objective function. Understanding which physicians the drug companies
target helps explain how conﬂicts of interest come about and what the possible solutions
may be.
3M o d e l
Ip r e s e n tas i m p l em o d e lt h a ti l l u s t r a t e st h em a i ni n t u i t i o no ft h ee ﬀects of publication and
disclosure law on payments. The pharmaceutical companies want to target physicians to
promote company products. However, they do not know the extent of the inﬂuence a given
physician has, and how eﬀective she will be in promoting the products. Prior publication
serves as a signal for inﬂuence the physicians have over their peers and in medical practice. In
equilibrium, pharmaceutical companies will target publishing physicians more heavily than
unpublished ones. Since, on average, the pharmaceutical companies earn higher revenues
from published physicians, payments to those physicians will be larger. This is the ﬁrst
result from the model. Next, I look at the eﬀect of disclosure laws on payments. Disclosure
laws act as a negative cost of entering into a contract with a pharmaceutical company,
which is equivalent to increasing the value of the outside option for physicians. The second
prediction of the model is that the increase in the outside option will result in higher payments
to publishing physicians.
Suppose a physician has type ✓ that measures the eﬀectiveness as a candidate to
promote pharmaceutical company products. The overall output also depends on eﬀort e,i n
a way that the project succeeds with probability p(e) and fails with probability 1   p(e).I
89assume the standard assumptions that the payoﬀ function is concave in e,m e a n i n gp0 > 0,
and p00 < 0.W h e nt h ep r o j e c ti ss u c c e s s f u l ,t h ep a y o ﬀ is ✓,a n d0 when it is not. The overall
payoﬀ is then given by:
Y = ✓p(e) (3.1)
The distribution of ✓ depends on whether the physician has published, Fp(✓),o rn o t ,
Fn(✓).Ia s s u m et h a tFp(✓) stochastically dominates Fn(✓),i nt h es e n s et h a th a v i n g( r e l e v a n t )
prior publications will make the physician a more eﬀective candidate for the pharmaceutical
company:
Fp(✓)  Fn(✓) (3.2)
Exerting eﬀort e costs the physician c(e) with standard assumption of convex costs:
c0(e) > 0,a n dc00(e) > 0. The physician has outside option of ¯ u.I f t h e p a y m e n t f r o m t h e
pharmaceutical company to the doctor is w,t h e nt h ep a y o ﬀ structure needs to satisfy:
w   c(e)   ¯ u (3.3)
Moreover, I specify that transfers cannot go the opposite way: w   0.
The pharmaceutical company’s objective, for a given physician type, is to maximize
the payoﬀ function:
max
w {✓p(e)   w} (3.4)
subject to,
e 2 argmax
˜ e
{w   c(˜ e)}
w   c(e)   ¯ u
If there is no informational asymmetry, the First Best solution will involve maximizing
the entire surplus:
e
⇤ 2 argmax
˜ e
{✓p(e)   c(˜ e)} (3.5)
90with the solution for w being:
w = c(e
⇤)+¯ u (3.6)
The First Order Condition (FOC) will be:
✓p
0(e
⇤)=c
0(e
⇤)
or
e
⇤ = e
⇤(✓) (3.7)
where e⇤0 > 0. Thus, the payoﬀ to the pharmaceutical company will be: ✓p(e⇤) c(e⇤)  ¯ u.
Suppose ✓0 is the cutoﬀ for non-negative proﬁts:
✓0p(e(✓0))   c(e(✓0))   ¯ u =0 (3.8)
Then, the proportion of doctors who get paid will be 1   F (✓0), and the average wage will
be:
E (w)=
Z
✓>✓0
[c(e
⇤ (✓)) + ¯ u]dF =
Z
✓>✓0
c(e
⇤ (✓))dF +( 1  F (✓0)) ¯ u (3.9)
Since Fp stochastically dominates Fn it follows that
Ep (w)   En (w) (3.10)
Thus, the model predicts that publishing physicians are being paid more than non-publishing
ones.
To consider the eﬀect of disclosure, I assume that such a law increases the cost of
each physician associating with the pharmaceutical company. Alternatively, it increases their
outside utility, ¯ u. The new participation constraint becomes
w = c(e
⇤)+¯ u + ↵ (3.11)
91where ↵ is the added cost of disclosure. The new setup does not change the optimal First
Order Condition, but will raise the cutoﬀ value, ✓0
0:
✓
0
0p(e(✓
0
0))   c(e(✓
0
0)) = ¯ u + ↵ (3.12)
Since, for a given eﬀort, average payment to physicians increases, lower payments and lower
eﬀorts are no longer counted. The average payment to physicians will then increase, and the
published physicians will be paid more under disclosure.
4D a t a
4.1 Physician Payments
The two main data sources are payments to physicians and the list of doctor publications.
The physician payment information comes from the Propublica dataset.85 It is a publicly
available dataset of pharmaceutical company payments to physicians, aggregated from avail-
able information on individual company websites. The pharmaceutical companies disclosed
such payments and made them available online mainly as a result of legal settlements with
the US Department of Justice;86 one or two ﬁrms did so voluntarily. For some voluntary
disclosures, for instance Allergen, the information was later removed from the company
website.87 According to Propublica, the collected data includes all disclosed payments of
pharmaceutical companies to physicians for the purpose of promoting pharmaceutical com-
pany products and does not include payments for speaking at medical education courses, or
as part of principal investigator funding.88 The data not only lists the type and payment to
85http://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/companies
86See, for instance: http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2009/jan/lillysignedsettlementagreement.pdf,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-civ-860.html,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/astrazeneca_settlementagreement.pdf.
87http://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/companies
88http://www.propublica.org/article/about-our-pharma-data
92the physician by the respective company, but also speciﬁes the date of the payments, as well
as the physician’s address, if available. The detailed address information is provided by the
physicians themselves, and in a small fraction of cases incorrect information, like “Anytown,”
or “Any Street” is provided.
The payments come from 12 pharmaceutical companies. They span from the third
quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2011 and account for roughly 42% of all the pharma-
ceutical payments to physicians. They are highly unevenly distributed among categories and
companies. Small payments dominate the list, the most popular category being meals. The
biggest contributor, by a large margin, is Pﬁzer, accounting for over 68% of all the payments
to physicians. The variation in payment information among diﬀerent companies stems from
the time individual legal settlements took place. As disclosure requirements become binding
over time, there are indications that future updates are gradually becoming more balanced.
The data contains payments directed to 316,622 physicians amounting to more than $316
million.
The payment categories for doctors are classiﬁed as consulting/advisory, speaking/
honoraria, research/clinical trial, meals, travel/lodging, items, other, or combinations of
those seven. Despite the large data size, the vast majority are a one-time payment to a
physician. In the dataset, the physician is usually paid by only one company and under one
category. This setup provides an intuitive measure of the relationship between a company
and a physician, and one can easily interpret the results as a form of link between the two.
4.2 Publication Count
In e x tl o o ka tt h ed a t as t r u c t u r eo ft h ep u b l i c a t i o n s .T a k i n gal i s to fa l lp u b l i c a t i o n sf r o mt h e
Web of Science, restricted to medical journals, I then match physician names to publications
with the same author name. In order to limit the number of false positives, I drop all common
names from the list of physicians. The procedure is similar to the method used in previous
research in the literature (Jacob and Lefgren 2011, and Li 2012). For example, I drop all
93Frequency of Occurences Unique Names Total Names
1 66,100 66,100
2 16,663 33,326
3 6,352 19,056
4 3,184 12,736
5 1,918 9,590
6 1,241 7,446
7 887 6,209
8 734 5,872
9 516 4,644
164,979
Table 3.1. The Set of Occurences for Uncommon Names
This table shows the result of removing common names for matching physicians to 
authors of medical journals. The resulting distribution shows the frequency of all 
remaining last names and the number of matching doctors.
last names that appear more than 10 times in the list. As anecdotal evidence, the most
common last names in my data are the same that Jacob and Lefgren (2011) encountered
in their dataset: Miller, Smith, and Johnson. Among frequently occurring names, I also
have non-Anglo-Saxon last names, such as Patel, Nguyen, and Wu, which have not appeared
before. Eliminating physicians with common names cuts the dataset by about 60%. This is
on par with the sample size cut that Jacob and Lefgren (2011) experienced (around 55%).
I am left with 164,979 physicians with uncommon names, who are paid by pharmaceutical
companies. As Table 3.1 illustrates, 40% of the last names appear only once in the dataset,
and 60% appear only once or twice. In the dataset, the physicians are identiﬁed not just by
last name, but also by ﬁrst name, middle name (or initial) and, possibly, geographic location.
Therefore, the same last name is not suﬃcient to indicate the same person in the sample.
Further, Table 3.2 illustrates that the number of payments from the pharmaceutical
companies ranges from one to eight. The number of categories from which doctors are paid
also ranges from one to eight. For example, I have four doctors who are paid by eight
diﬀerent pharmaceutical companies, but only one is paid across eight categories. The vast
94majority of the payments per physician are from one company (80%), and for one category
(84%). The summary statistics in Table 3.3 show that the mean payment is roughly $1,885.
The distribution, however, is very right-skewed with the maximum payment being over
$429,000. The table also provides a breakdown of the payments by pharmaceutical company
and across categories. As pointed out earlier, the vast majority of payments (83%) are
for meals. However, other categories such as combination, items, and speaking are also
important components of payments to physicians.
Among the paying pharmaceutical companies, the largest amount comes from Pﬁzer,
accounting for about 69% of all payments. Other companies, such as Cephalon, Eli Lilly,
and Allergen also make payment contributions to physicians, but not at the same level as
Pﬁzer. (Or at least their detailed payment information has not been made fully public). The
remaining companies are not signiﬁcant players in the payment market. Such a disparity,
especially when compared to their market share, is explained by the way that the data is
constructed and depends on when the companies were forced to disclose their payments
and make such information public. There is evidence that over time the disclosed payment
information is more balanced.
Il o o ka tt h ep a y m e n t so fp h a r m a c e u t i c a lc o m p a n i e st op h y s i c i a n sb a s e do nt h e i r
type, as deﬁned by their publication information. The number of physicians who have ever
published is 13,295 or roughly 8% of the possible 164,979 doctors in the dataset. Physicians
who published are on average paid higher than non-published ones: a mean of $4,584 versus
$1,884.89 The distribution of payments also shows that the publishing physicians are more
likely to be paid by multiple companies and for multiple categories. When looking at the
frequency of each category, the published physicians are paid more in categories that could be
relevant in targeting researchers: consulting, research, speaking, and travel. They are paid
similar shares in categories typically not considered speciﬁc to research: items and meals.
This can serve as further evidence that the pharmaceutical companies target publishing
89However, the maximum payment is lower for the published physicians than it is for unpublished ones.
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96Pharma Co. Percentage Pharma Co. Percentage
Allergan 13.07% Allergan 11.37%
AstraZeneca 0.80% AstraZeneca 1.52%
Cephalon 18.73% Cephalon 30.80%
EMDSerono 2.05% EMDSerono 3.82%
EliLilly 15.79% EliLilly 26.48%
GSK 2.64% GSK 6.66%
JJ 0.66% JJ 1.47%
Merck 0.78% Merck 2.04%
Novartis 0.81% Novartis 1.53%
Pfizer 68.82% Pfizer 65.04%
Valeant 2.58% Valeant 4.18%
ViiV 0.12% ViiV 0.26%
Category Type Frequency Category Type Frequency
Combination 13.07% Combination 11.37%
Consulting 2.42% Consulting 7.27%
Items 10.21% Items 12.13%
Meals 83.55% Meals 83.83%
Other 0.75% Other 1.58%
Research 1.25% Research 3.10%
Speaking 6.70% Speaking 12.47%
Travel 3.81% Travel 8.00%
Payment Payment
Mean $1,884.79 Mean $4,584.14
St Dev $10,808.69 St Dev $18,205.02
Min $1 Min $1
Max $429,328 Max $327,103
All Physicians
Table 3.3. Frequency of Payments by Company or Type of Category
Publishing Physicians
This table shows the frequency of payments for each physician by pharmaceutical companies and 
type of categories. The results are reported for all physicians and for publishing physicians only.
97physicians for their research expertise, and publication measures can be used as a proxy for
eﬀectiveness. Publishing physicians will, therefore, command higher fees for their services.
The underlying story of the overall sample – physician payment have a large mode of one
payment for one category – still holds true for published physicians: The majority (61%) of
physicians are paid by one company, and an even bigger majority (75%) of the physicians
are paid under only one category.
On the publication side, the set of 13,295 physicians accounts for 90,122 published
papers. I restrict the earliest publication date to 1990 to ensure that the correct people
are matched to their publications and that the published research is scientiﬁcally relevant
during the payment period of 2009-2011. In addition, the Web of Science extends only to
2009, meaning that all physician publications occurred before the payments in my sample.
This is important because one might think of the direction of causality going the opposite
way, with payments inducing more publications.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Relationship Between Payment and Publication
Does physician type, deﬁned as having prior publications, lead to higher payments from
pharmaceutical companies? I analyze this eﬀect by looking at various speciﬁcations of publi-
cation measures. The simplest speciﬁcation, derived from the model, is an indicator variable
that is 1 if the physician has a prior publication and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, I
also look at the total publication count, the total citation count, and also the log of publica-
tion and citation counts. Table 3.4 indicates that in all speciﬁcations of publication measures
there is a strong positive relationship between publication and citation. Having a publica-
tion accounts for $1,180 more in payments. Increasing the publication count by 1% adds
an additional $500 in payments. When the dependent variable is citation (or log-citation)
count, year ﬁxed eﬀects become necessary, as older years will have fewer citations simply
98due to truncated data. The Web of Science database on publications and citations ends
in 2009, and papers that are published earlier will have, on average, more citations than
later publications. The year ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression will account for the negative bias
on citations over time. In all speciﬁcations, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
included with the point estimates.
The results indicate a positive, and economically and statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship between past publication and subsequent higher payments for physicians. The baseline
OLS results, however, may be problematic due to omitted variable bias that is correlated
with publication count and subsequent payment amount. I account for the possible endo-
geneity in two ways. First, I restrict the sample by looking at only the most established
publishing physicians, who I deﬁne as those having a publication prior to 2001. By looking
at the cutoﬀ sample only, I try to account for the quality of physician eﬀectiveness that is
not correlated with the error term. Looking at physicians who have published earlier will
presumably isolate the most established researchers and also lessen any time-persistent omit-
ted variable eﬀects that are correlated with prior publications and future payments. Table
3.5 shows that the positive relationship between payment and publication still holds when
accounting for earlier years only.
The second way to account for possible endogeneity between publication and pay-
ments is to look at variations that aﬀect payment levels, but not the link from publications
(or physician types) to payments. State-level variation in disclosure laws provides such a
natural setup. By dividing the physicians into two groups – those who reside in states with
existing strong disclosure laws, and those who do not, I can isolate an exogenous variation
of payments to physicians that is orthogonal to physician’s publication record. Table 3.6
presents the results of regressing payment on publishing measures when controlling for ex-
isting disclosure laws. The publication eﬀect on payments remains positive and signiﬁcant.
The interaction term is also positive and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, consistent with the
model of higher disclosure leading to higher payments.
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1025.2 Relationship of Payments Between Authors
If the pharmaceutical companies target established physicians through publication measures,
how do they select among two published physicians who are conducting similar research?
If two coauthors are equally likely to be chosen by the pharmaceutical company, would the
company target only one, or try to a create network of authors with similar research interests?
I analyze whether coauthorship increases or decreases the likelihood of being paid by the
same pharmaceutical company and for the same category. I limit the dataset only to those
articles with a coauthor paid by the pharmaceutical company in the 2009-2011 timespan.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the time trend of author counts from 1990 to 2009. As
Figure 3.2 shows, over time there is a general trend of increased number of authors per
paper. For the unmatched sample, which includes both common and uncommon names,
the average number of authors per paper steadily grows from 4.6 in 1990 to over 7.5 by the
end of the sample in 2009. Figure 3.1 restricts the list of coauthors paid by pharmaceutical
companies. The restricted sample of coauthors with uncommon names also shows an overall
positive trend that starts at 1.14 and grows to 1.17 by 2009.
Trimming the dataset to only coauthored papers signiﬁcantly reduces the number of
publications. I look at the probability of being paid by the same pharmaceutical company
or for the same category, conditional on coauthorship. To do this, I use logit and probit
speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is 1 if the author and coauthor are paid by the
same company or for the same category. As a robustness check, I also weight each observation
by the number of times an author appears in the data, so that the author-coauthor link and
the coauthor-author link are not counted twice and would not artiﬁcially increase the sample
size. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 indicate that for the major pharmaceutical companies, there is a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between a coauthor and an author being paid by the same
company. There is also a signiﬁcant positive relationship in the likelihood of being paid for
the same type of category. The results are not statistically signiﬁcant for the pharmaceutical
companies that have a smaller share of payments to physicians.
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105(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit
Allergan 0.783*** 0.538*** 0.768*** 0.380*** 0.250*** 0.374***
(0.0587) (0.0648) (0.0588) (0.0329) (0.0383) (0.0329)
AstraZeneca -0.346** -0.364** -0.686*** -0.157* -0.178* -0.341***
(0.132) (0.136) (0.142) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0804)
Cephalon 1.018*** 0.994*** 1.006*** 0.543*** 0.544*** 0.536***
(0.0390) (0.0420) (0.0391) (0.0213) (0.0232) (0.0214)
EMDSerono -0.219* -0.124 -0.229* -0.145** -0.0835+ -0.150**
(0.0972) (0.0854) (0.0971) (0.0557) (0.0495) (0.0557)
EliLilly 1.000*** 0.911*** 0.959*** 0.531*** 0.497*** 0.511***
(0.0402) (0.0431) (0.0405) (0.0220) (0.0240) (0.0222)
GSK -0.00948 0.192** -0.202** -0.0200 0.112** -0.129**
(0.0712) (0.0671) (0.0768) (0.0415) (0.0392) (0.0443)
JJ 0.319* 0.359** 0.0806 0.199* 0.218** 0.0463
(0.156) (0.133) (0.169) (0.0915) (0.0795) (0.0986)
Merck 0.0558 0.0363 -0.116 0.0234 0.00724 -0.0626
(0.114) (0.116) (0.117) (0.0664) (0.0663) (0.0679)
Novartis -0.133 -0.0377 -0.265 -0.103 -0.0417 -0.171+
(0.182) (0.178) (0.186) (0.102) (0.100) (0.104)
Pfizer 2.221*** 2.217*** 2.199*** 1.300*** 1.315*** 1.287***
(0.0361) (0.0378) (0.0363) (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0204)
Valeant -0.745*** -0.738*** -0.713*** -0.479*** -0.464*** -0.460***
(0.0835) (0.0779) (0.0829) (0.0488) (0.0451) (0.0488)
ViiV -1.112*** -1.182*** -0.950*** -0.698*** -0.737*** -0.582***
(0.265) (0.191) (0.270) (0.154) (0.115) (0.157)
Avg Payment 0.0113*** 0.00607***
(in 000's) (0.00165) (0.000850)
Citation Count -0.0674** -0.0406**
(in 00's) (0.0247) (0.0145)
Const -1.272*** -1.380*** -1.240*** -0.708*** -0.792*** -0.689***
(0.0389) (0.0412) (0.0398) (0.0218) (0.0235) (0.0223)
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 23178 23178 23178 23178 23178 23178
Table 3.7. The Relationship of Coauthorship on Payment 
Types Across Companies
Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if the coauthors are paid by 
the same pharmaceutical company. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant 
at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.
106(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit
Combination 0.930*** 0.795*** 0.936*** 0.416*** 0.349*** 0.418***
(0.0873) (0.0921) (0.0881) (0.0451) (0.0456) (0.0454)
Consulting 0.405*** 0.563*** 0.455*** 0.137** 0.218*** 0.160**
(0.0934) (0.107) (0.0987) (0.0509) (0.0576) (0.0531)
Items 0.854*** 0.883*** 0.858*** 0.359*** 0.370*** 0.361***
(0.0838) (0.0982) (0.0841) (0.0409) (0.0468) (0.0410)
Meals 3.749*** 3.883*** 3.760*** 2.034*** 2.136*** 2.038***
(0.0759) (0.0893) (0.0770) (0.0375) (0.0420) (0.0380)
Other 1.176*** 1.333*** 1.175*** 0.355*** 0.438** 0.358***
(0.210) (0.298) (0.210) (0.108) (0.163) (0.107)
Research 0.894*** 0.900*** 0.983*** 0.445*** 0.453*** 0.487***
(0.125) (0.121) (0.136) (0.0686) (0.0693) (0.0732)
Speaking 1.149*** 0.948*** 1.185*** 0.524*** 0.428*** 0.539***
(0.0835) (0.0939) (0.0905) (0.0418) (0.0458) (0.0452)
Travel -0.0791 0.0185 -0.0407 -0.0674 -0.0282 -0.0506
(0.118) (0.131) (0.122) (0.0606) (0.0649) (0.0622)
Avg Payment -0.00330 -0.00138
(in 000's) (0.00254) (0.00117)
Citation Count -0.102*** -0.0588***
(in 00's) (0.0302) (0.0159)
Const 14.27 22.83* 19.93* -0.654*** -0.810*** 10.10*
(9.400) (9.713) (9.579) (0.0387) (0.0438) (5.004)
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 23178 23178 23178 23178 23178 23178
Table 3.8. The Relationship of Coauthorship on Payment Types 
Across Categories
Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if coauthors are paid for the 
same category. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 
0.1%.
107This indicates that instead of targeting one or two people who are “experts” in their
respective ﬁelds, the pharmaceutical companies are targeting networks of researchers. They
are also paying them for similar services. The result is true for seemingly complementary
events, such as meals and travel, where, for example, one event can bring many people
with the same interests together. But it is also true for seemingly substitutable categories,
such as consulting and speaking. The results indicate that the pharmaceutical companies
are interested in networks of physicians and seem to be expansive even in categories where
coauthors could act as competitors. To give a concrete example, only 3% of the physicians
in the coauthor sample were paid by Merck in the research category; and given that they
have been paid, the probability that their coauthor will also be paid by Merck for research
jumps to 10%, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, if coauthors are more likely to be paid by the same pharmaceutical com-
pany, and for the same category, they are also more likely to be aware of others in a research
ﬁeld who are also being paid (though perhaps not the magnitude of the payments). This may
serve as a quasi-disclosure eﬀect within the research ﬁeld. Since coauthors are, on average,
paid more than single authors, such a ﬁnding conforms with the same disclosure eﬀect on
payments resulting in larger payments for coauthors. This may even induce more inclusion
of other researchers into the payment network. Though, additional data is needed to fully
establish the latter result.
5.3 Relationship of Payments Between Citing and Cited Authors
As a robustness check for payment networks, I expand the research ﬁeld deﬁnition beyond
coauthorship by looking at the eﬀect of prior citation links on subsequent payments by
the same pharmaceutical company and for the same category. I link researchers who cite
each other but have previously not been coauthors, and look at the eﬀect of such links on
payments. The result of coauthorship also holds true for cited and citing authors. Tables 3.9
and 3.10 show that physicians working in the same type of research, who cite each other but
108have previously not been coauthors, are more likely to be paid by the same pharmaceutical
company and for the same category of payments.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Il o o ka th o wp h a r m a c e u t i c a lc o m p a n i e sd e t e r m i n et h ep a y m e n t st h e yg i v et op h y s i c i a n s
to promote their products. Merging the Propublica dataset that reports roughly 42% of all
payments to doctors from 2009 to 2011, with the Web of Science journal database, I identify
payments to physicians along with their publication history. Using publication measure as
ap r o x yf o rp h y s i c i a ne ﬀectiveness, I ﬁnd that physicians with more publications are paid
higher amounts, on average. The result conforms to model predictions and is robust to
alternative speciﬁcations of publication measures.
To account for possible endogeneity, I use the variation in state laws on disclosure:
Certain states have strong laws mandating publication of all payments to physicians, while
others do not. Looking at the eﬀect of disclosure laws on payments to publishing physicians,
Iﬁ n dap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of disclosure law on payments for publishing physicians consistent
with the model. The result, also borne out by the model through increasing physician’s
outside option, is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcation is also robust
to accounting for earlier years of publications only.
If the pharmaceutical companies target publishing physicians, how do they choose a
particular doctor in a given research ﬁeld or choose between two coauthors? I ﬁnd strong
network eﬀects of pharmaceutical companies targeting entire research ﬁelds versus only one
or two specialists. Coauthors are more likely to be paid by the same company and for the
same category. I ﬁnd a similar eﬀect for networks comprised of citation links who have
never previously been coauthors. The citing and the cited authors are also more likely to
be paid by the same company and for the same category. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant for large
pharmaceutical payers in the dataset. The network eﬀect is consistent with the disclosure of
109(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit
Allergan 0.288*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.165***
(0.0422) (0.0490) (0.0423) (0.0243) (0.0287) (0.0287)
AstraZeneca 0.0158 0.199+ -0.0439 0.0123 0.120+ 0.0775
(0.0790) (0.108) (0.0821) (0.0454) (0.0620) (0.0650)
Cephalon 0.832*** 0.839*** 0.834*** 0.478*** 0.482*** 0.484***
(0.0249) (0.0330) (0.0249) (0.0140) (0.0186) (0.0186)
EMDSerono -0.00169 -0.182* -0.00753 -0.00391 -0.109* -0.109*
(0.0713) (0.0808) (0.0715) (0.0414) (0.0474) (0.0475)
EliLilly 0.721*** 0.648*** 0.724*** 0.413*** 0.372*** 0.368***
(0.0260) (0.0344) (0.0262) (0.0146) (0.0194) (0.0194)
GSK -0.0553 0.0383 -0.0828* -0.0302 0.0235 0.00182
(0.0372) (0.0477) (0.0389) (0.0216) (0.0279) (0.0292)
JJ 0.0463 -0.0923 0.0238 0.0224 -0.0629 -0.0759
(0.0914) (0.111) (0.0922) (0.0544) (0.0667) (0.0665)
Merck 0.302*** 0.115 0.278*** 0.174*** 0.0633 0.0420
(0.0580) (0.0768) (0.0588) (0.0338) (0.0448) (0.0452)
Novartis 0.0880 0.0934 0.0711 0.0438 0.0509 0.0337
(0.0923) (0.105) (0.0928) (0.0529) (0.0613) (0.0621)
Pfizer 2.531*** 2.466*** 2.530*** 1.533*** 1.495*** 1.494***
(0.0248) (0.0316) (0.0250) (0.0142) (0.0182) (0.0183)
Valeant -0.152* -0.190* -0.147* -0.0935* -0.116* -0.111*
(0.0669) (0.0790) (0.0670) (0.0386) (0.0458) (0.0457)
ViiV -0.0267 -0.157 -0.0236 -0.0247 -0.106 -0.107
(0.173) (0.216) (0.174) (0.102) (0.134) (0.135)
Avg Payment 0.00134* 0.00106*
(in 000's) (0.000563) (0.000472)
Citation Count -0.00108** -0.00137**
(in 00's) (0.000403) (0.000461)
Const -1.801*** -1.753*** -1.801*** -1.080*** -1.053*** -1.053***
(0.0267) (0.0335) (0.0268) (0.0153) (0.0194) (0.0194)
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52138 52138 52138 52138 52138 52138
Table 3.9. The Relationship of Citations and Payment Types 
Across Companies
Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if citing and cited authors are 
paid by the same pharmaceutical company. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** 
Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.
110(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit
Combination 0.123*** 0.169*** 0.180*** 0.0649** 0.0929*** 0.0986***
(0.0373) (0.0455) (0.0457) (0.0227) (0.0279) (0.0279)
Consulting 0.647*** 0.688*** 0.757*** 0.382*** 0.406*** 0.445***
(0.0366) (0.0519) (0.0535) (0.0217) (0.0303) (0.0311)
Items 0.738*** 0.766*** 0.761*** 0.435*** 0.455*** 0.451***
(0.0321) (0.0414) (0.0417) (0.0188) (0.0241) (0.0242)
Meals 1.681*** 1.730*** 1.757*** 1.030*** 1.060*** 1.075***
(0.0292) (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0174) (0.0227) (0.0230)
Other 0.129 0.0126 0.0115 0.0795 0.00850 0.00860
(0.0842) (0.129) (0.128) (0.0495) (0.0733) (0.0732)
Research 0.601*** 0.634*** 0.753*** 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.438***
(0.0531) (0.0733) (0.0760) (0.0311) (0.0426) (0.0442)
Speaking 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.268*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.156***
(0.0277) (0.0356) (0.0380) (0.0167) (0.0215) (0.0230)
Travel -0.0474 -0.0789 0.0119 -0.0285 -0.0440 0.00752
(0.0400) (0.0556) (0.0585) (0.0239) (0.0328) (0.0343)
Avg Payment -0.00500*** -0.00293***
(in 000's) (0.000764) (0.000461)
Citation Count 0.00371** 0.00208***
(in 00's) (0.00125) (0.000596)
Const -1.225*** -1.311*** -1.341*** -0.744*** -0.798*** -0.814***
(0.0301) (0.0397) (0.0404) (0.0179) (0.0235) (0.0238)
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52138 52138 52138 52138 52138 52138
Table 3.10. The Relationship of Citations and Payment Types 
Across Categories
Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 1 if citing and cited authors are paid 
for the same category. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** 
Significant at 0.1%.
111being paid within a research ﬁeld leading to higher payments. However, more data is needed
to establish the link.
As a next step in analyzing network eﬀects, one might look at the subsequent pub-
lications of physicians who were paid by the same pharmaceutical company, but who had
not collaborated previously. Both the probability of such a collaboration taking place and
the quality of research will be important outcome variables to consider. Large collabora-
tions may indicate pharmaceutical companies serving as research hubs beyond the usual
university and hospital networks. The quality of research will show the impact of such hubs
on the overall advancement of science. Overall, they will both measure the possible eﬀect
that pharmaceutical companies’ payments have on research, beyond promoting their own
products.
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120Appendix Table A. Federal Statutes and Doctrinal Developments  
in Abortion Rights Law 
 
Statute or 
Legal Decision 
Year  Statutory Provision or Doctrinal holding  Regulation 
challenged 
Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 
1973  The Court recognized the right to choose to have 
an abortion as part of a broader constitutional 
right of privacy. States may proscribe abortion 
only in the third trimester, with an exception for 
the mother’s health. 
Texas 
statute 
Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179  
1973  The Court overturned provisions requiring that 
abortion be performed in an accredited hospital, 
approved by a hospital committee, and that three 
physicians confirm that an abortion should be 
performed. 
Georgia 
statute 
Hyde 
Amendment 
1976  Federal provision (amendment to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act) prohibited states from 
receiving federal Medicaid funding for abortions, 
except when the pregnancy jeopardized the 
mother’s life or the pregnancy was the result of 
rape or incest. 
Federal 
statute 
Maher v. Roe, 
432 U.S. 464 
1977  The Court upheld a state policy that refused to 
provide Medicaid funding for non-therapeutic 
abortions, allowing funding only for “medically 
necessary” first-trimester abortions.  
Connecticut 
statute 
Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438 
1977  The Court held that Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act does not require states to fund 
elective or non-therapeutic first-trimester 
abortions to receive Medicaid funding. 
Federal 
statute 
Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297 
1980  The Court upheld the Hyde Amendment.  Federal 
statute 
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Planned 
Parenthood of 
Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 
1992  The Court upheld statutory provision requiring 
parental notification for minors seeking an 
abortion, certain reporting requirements for 
abortion providers, and an “informed consent” 
provision requiring abortion providers to inform 
women of the age of the fetus and health risks of 
abortion and childbirth 24 hours before the 
procedure.  The Court overturned the provision 
requiring that their husbands be notified when 
married women seek an abortion and rejected the 
trimester framework of Roe in favor of a viability 
inquiry more in line with medical advances. 
Pennsylvania 
statute 
Freedom of 
Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 248 
1994  Federal statute made it a crime to injure, 
intimidate, or interfere with persons seeking to 
obtain or provide reproductive health services or to 
intentionally damage or destroy property of a 
reproductive health care facility. 
Federal 
statute 
Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network 
of Western New 
York, 519 U.S. 
357 
1997  The Court upheld “fixed buffer zones” around 
abortion clinics that prohibit protestors from 
demonstrating while invalidating “floating buffer 
zones” around moving persons and cars. 
Injunction 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 
2000  The Court overturned a ban on the “partial-birth” 
abortion, a specific and unusual method of second-
trimester abortion. Because the statute’s language 
broadly encompassed the standard second-trimester 
abortion procedure as well as this variant, the 
statute imposed an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to choose.  The statute also lacked an 
exception for the mother’s health. 
Nebraska 
statute 
Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban 
Act 
2003  This statute prohibited the “partial birth” abortion.  Federal 
statute 
Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 
2007  The Court upheld the federal Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, whose wording was 
sufficiently narrow. 
Federal 
statute 
 
122Judicial Pool Characteristics for Abortion      
(1971-2004) Mean St Dev Min Max N
Number of Judges 16.835 7.212 3 48 408
Docket Size 3209.19 2135.45 353 12151 408
Probability of Panel Being Assigned Exactly One 
Democratic Appointee 0.411 0.094 0 0.54895 408
Probability of Panel Being Assigned At Least Two 
Democratic Appointees 0.413 0.203 0 1 408
Number of Abortion Panels 0.35 0.605 0 3 408
Number of Abortion Panels Having Exactly One 
Democratic Appointee 0.191 0.463 0 3 408
Number of Abortion Panels Having At Least Two 
Democratic Appointees 0.125 0.373 0 2 408
Number of Pro-Choice Appellate Abortion Decisions 0.203 0.476 0 3 408
Difference between expected and realized proportion of 
democrats on panels 0.553 0.471 0 1 117
GSS Respondents
Age 45.276 17.498 18 89 14409
Male 0.563 0.496 0 1 14466
Should it be possible for a woman to obtain a legal 
abortion if:
there is strong chance of serious defect in the baby? 0.8 0.4 0 1 9,189
she is married and she does not want any more 
children? 0.44 0.5 0 1 9,160
the woman’s own health is seriously endangered by 
the pregnancy? 0.9 0.3 0 1 9,216
the family has a very low income and cannot afford 
any more children? 0.47 0.5 0 1 9,122
she became pregnant as a result of rape? 0.82 0.38 0 1 9,154
she is not married and does not want to marry the 
man? 0.44 0.5 0 1 9,159
the woman wants it for any reason? 0.4 0.49 0 1 7,969
Political Party Affiliation:
Strong Democrat 0.15 0.36 0 1 14,370
Democrat, but not a strong Democrat 0.21 0.41 0 1 14,370
Independent, near Democrat 0.12 0.33 0 1 14,370
Independent 0.15 0.36 0 1 14,370
Independent, near Republican 0.09 0.28 0 1 14,370
Republican, but not a strong Republican 0.17 0.38 0 1 14,370
Strong Republican 0.1 0.3 0 1 14,370
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